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ABSTRACT
This thesis identifies those human factors which impact on a
commander's decision in a tactical combat environment. Various models
for categorization are discussed. The study argues that in order to
establish clear casual/effect relationships between human factors and
battle outcome, concentration of analytical research must focus on first
ikirer effects. Two caLegorical judgment surveys in the form of question-
naires are developed. Results from the surveys are transformed to interval
scales. The first survey is exploratory in nature and allows respondents
to apply 27 endogenous factors within a generic tactical context. The
second survey presents four specific tactical scenarios in which the top
seven factors identified in the first survey can be applied. Respondent
selection for the first survey represented the four military services while
respondent selection for the second survey was limited to Army officers.
The study concludes that the top seven factors are: Leadership, Training/
Experience, Initiative, Discipline, Cohesion, Morale, and Will/Motivation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Convincing people to fight and getting them to do it well, is one of the
more essential and less obvious aspects of maintaining an armed force.
Illusions must be created, and maintained, often unto death. Few individ-
uals, once aware what combat is all about, want to spend any time at it."
[Ref. 1: p. 291]
Throughout the history of military organizations, commanders have at-
tempted to maximize the utility of the individual soldier. By altering organiza-
tions, battlefield formations, orders of battle, and styles of warfare, commanders
directly determine the fate of their subordinates.
indeed, the importance of considering all aspects of the soldier, accounting for
every human factor, shines through in the analysis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
where "human factors were found to be the major determinants of the outcome
of battles [Ref. 2: p.14]." Due to a higher level of complexity, advances in tech-
nology increase the attention paid to human interface planning and man-machine
interaction considerations. A recent example of how human dimension aspects
directly affected a commander's decision-making ability occurred during fighting
in the Persian Gulf.
On 3 July 1988, the Aegis cruiser U.S.S. Vincennes was patrolling the dan-
gerous waters of the Persian Gulf. While the Vincennes was engaged in a surface
gunbattle with Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps gunboats, a mix of unsub-
stantiated reports coupled with intense stress and task fixation contributed to the
launching of two surface-to-air missiles against a target thought to be an attack-
ing Iranian F-14 fighter. As a result, the commercial flight Iran Air 655 with 290
passengers on board was shot down. Human error certainly contributed to this
tragedy [Ref. 3: pp. 108-111]. Additionally, a series of tactical command and
control (C2) decisions were made which, at the time, fully justified the launch
given the information available to the decision-maker.
On 20 December 1989, the United States invaded Panama. The objectives
were the security of the Panama canal, the restoration of a democratic govern-
ment, and the capture of deposed Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. Fierce
fighting ensued from the start of the operation through the first three days and
innumerable acts of heroism and bravery occurred, but one of the greatest psy-
chological factors (which persisted for several weeks after the invasion) was the
presence of Panamanian snipers. The potential for being killed or wounded by
this seemingly indiscriminate fire increased perceived stress and fear levels far
beyond those experienced from force-on-force firefights [Ref. 4]. It is the indi-
vidual makeup of each soldier operating as part of the larger group which will
directly or indirectly impact the commander's decision.
Two endeavors which are at the leading edge of research in ensuring adequate
attention is paid to human factors integration are the Manpower and Integration
(MANPRINT) Program and the More Operational Realism in Modeling of
Combat (MORIMOC) effort. MORIMOC represents a substantial effort by the
Military Operations Research Society (MORS) to integrate human factors and
human performance data where needed in existing and future combat models.
To date, MORIMOC has made progress toward the identification and inte-
gration of the varied professional fields which must interface if this multi-
disciplinary effort is to succeed. MANPRINT is a Department of the Army
ODCSPER (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel) sponsored program
whose effort is to "reduce the dependence of system performance upon extraor-
dinary, unsustainable levels of soldier performance and human resources, and to
alleviate human performance problems [Ref. 5: p. 9-1]." Under this program,
consideration to human factors must be given throughout all aspects of engi-
neering design, system integration, and organizational development.
The fundamental question of the human factors integration issue is simply
stated: Given that human factors are important, how can the effects of human
factors be qualitatively defined to determine which human factors matter?
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The primary goal of this study was to develop and demonstrate a research
methodology that isolates those human factors which are important relative to a
command and control (C2) decision. The study addressed four major objectives:
1. To develop a list of human factors which are considered relevant to com-
mand and control decisions and to show possible categorization techniques;
2. To conceptually develop some of the second, third, and higher order re-
lationships that must be considered and which will require further explora-
tion;
3. To demonstrate statistical methods necessary to quantify, rank, and m(,ie
importantly, provide an interval scale of the human factors;
4. Finally, to determine if the relevant human factors are scenario or context-
dependent. In other words, given another set of input variables depicting a
scenario, do the scaled values or the rankings of the human factors signif-
icantly differ?
Based on the premise that human factors research currently underway will
continue, a systematic, building block approach was used in answering the ob-
jectives of this study. As a result, the thesis presents a dynamic, yet straightfor-
ward approach that produces a final output of quantified human factors. The
research was initiated through the identification of the human factors which are
relevant to C2 decisions. With a defined list of human factors, several methods
of categorizing the factors were reviewed with three deemed appropriate for
inclusion in this study. The first method classifies the factors based on when each
factor is seen to impact on a battle. The second method focuses on whether or
not the factor is affected by internal or external stimuli, while the third focuses
on the change in combat potential/combat power resulting from stimuli on factors
related to either the individual soldier or to a group of soldiers.
Human factors research is best conducted using human beings as the research
subject [Ref. 6: p. 20]. As such, the approach selected drew research subjects
from an 'expert' pool of knowledgeable personnel. The selected experts were
personnel who had previously commanded or held leadership positions within a
military organization. These experts judged the relative importance of the selected
human factors based on the conscious or subconscious application these factors
within their personal leadership experiences. A questionnaire, in the form of a
3
categorical judgment survey, was designed as an exploratory tool and was ad-
ministered to a sample population of experienced commanders. The results from
this first survey (termed the Initial Survey or Survey 1) were quantified, placed on
a common scale, and ranked. The top seven factors identified during Survey I
were used as input for the second survey. The second survey (termed the
Follow-On Surveey or Survey II) focussed on determining whether the context or
scenario to which the factors were applied would make a significant difference in
the relative importance of the factors. With the results from both surveys in
hand, a potential roadmap for future research endeavors was developed in order
to provide continuity and to allow this study to be used as a base document for
follow-on human factors research.
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II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Imagine, for the moment, a world devoid of the peculiarities and individual-
ities of the human -- a society where all beings think, talk, walk, look, feel, decide,
and act the same. The actions or reactions of a 'person' in this society are rea-
sonably predictable. There is an existing set of variables or 'things' which are
present when the person acts in a certain manner. Some of these variables are
internal to the individual person, while other variables are external to the person
and exist in the environment. Some of the variables are present only within the
individual while others are apparent only in group interaction. In order to real-
istically predict the behavior of a member of this society, all possible combina-
tions of variables must be tested. At the point where every variable combination
has been tested and the results have been verified, a clear cause and effect re-
lationship pattern exists. The cause, in this case, is the input variables while the
outcome is represented by the event outcome -- the observable behavior. The
input variables cause an action to occur. Since there is no variability from one
person to the next, standardization of the results is not required. The observed
or quantified value for each of the variables is the norm.
The domain of human factors is elusive and difficult to capture, both con-
ceptually and physically. Even within the 'carbon copy' society described above,
all variable combinations must be tested if one wanted to positively establish that
a certain variable combination will produce a specified result. How would this
experiment be designed? Indeed, are the factors even quantifiable? If they are, do
the appropriate tools exist to measure varying levels of these factors?
The details to this problem are infinite. Even though the example presented
above is relatively simple, its purpose has been well served if the reader takes
away but one point -- the extreme difficulty involved in any attempt to
quantitatively structure a qualitative factor.
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The focus of this section of the thesis is to define how human factors and the
C 2 environment are intertwined. Following a definition of command and control,
human factors are defined, described, and delineated. This is followed by a de-
scription of the overall (big picture) integration of human factors which includes
arguments supporting the lowest level that should be considered, a discussion on
causal,'effect relationships, and the impact of human factors research.
Command and control is re-visited with particular attention on how and
where human factors impact on the decision cycle as described within current C2
models. For completeness, one section presents a cursory discussion of factor
aggregation. Finally, several models for classifying the factors are described in
detail.
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL
In order to understand how human factors affect C2 decision-making, it is
necessary to understand some unique terms associated with commanding soldiers
within a military organization.
1. Connand and Control Defined
The definitions presented in this section represent the currently accepted
meanings. The primary function within this study is command. Command, as
defined in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication I (JCS Pub 1), is:
"The authority which a commander in the military service lawfully exer-
cises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command in-
cludes the authority and responsibility for planning the employment of,
organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the
accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for
health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel." [Ref. 7: p.
74]
This definition implies action by the commander -- organizing forces for optimal
performance, directing force actions to accomplish a mission, coordinating force
action to achieve synchronization, and controlling the force to assure conservation
of effort.
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The commander is the individual who exercises command. He does so
through a process referred to as command and control. As defined, command and
control is:
"The exercise of authority and direction by properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement
of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures which
are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission."
[Ref. 7: p. 74]
Command is the function of the commander. Command and control is the
process the commander uses to exercise command. Command and control deci-
sions are those decisions which enable the commander to impose or express his
will to his subordinates.
2. The Nature of Combat
As part of defining command and control, one must determine the type
of environment in which a C2 system must be capable of functioning. The envi-
ronment can range from deterministic to totally indeterminate. Different types
of systems must be considered and applied to the requirements of the command
and the demands of the environment. In this respect, the nature of combat must
be taken into account when devising a system to function within a combat envi-
ronment. There are four principal types of systems or environments.
Deterministic systems are those in which a certain stimulus results in a
known reaction. An example of this is pulling a trigger on a rifle. Assuming that
the rifle is functional and loaded, then a pull on the trigger will result in a round
being fired. Except for the purely technical and mechanical aspects of combat,
this type of command and control system is not found on the battlefield.
Afoderately stochastic systems are those in which a certain stimulus may
result in one of several outcomes with known probability distribution. The likeli-
hood of a gunner hitting his target under constant conditions is an example of this
type of system. Most facets of modern combat can hardly be considered within
this category.
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Severely stochastic systcms are those in which a single condition can result
in many different outcomes through a more complicated probability network. A
decision to fire a weapon at a target at a certain time could be an example of this
system. Severely stochastic systems abound on the battlefield.
Indeterminate or chaotic systems are those systems in which no outcome
can be predicted from a certain condition or set of conditions with any probabil-
ity. Most aspects of combat can be placed within this category. [Ref. 8: pp.
52-54].
3. The Importance of Command and Control
Hypothetically, if two forces are engaged in combat with all other things
being equal, the force with more effective C2 should have the upper hand. For
the purposes of this study, a commander's decision (also referred to as a C2 deci-
sion) represents his judgment or determination as to the best course of action. The
influence a commander can generate through a C2 decision is for the most part
immeasurable, primarily due to the stochastic and somewhat chaotic nature of
modern combat. Combat situations with exactly the same parameters lack
reproducibility and, as a result, one has to rely on post-battle analysis to postulate
the outcome that a different decision might have caused. In his book Command
In l1ar, Van Crevald addresses the force multiplier effect of command by stating
that: "Napoleon's presence on the battlefield was said by some of his enemies...to
be worth a corps of forty thousand men." [Ref. 9: p. 8]
Just as command can serve as a force multiplier, it can most assuredly
become the Achilles' heel. Poor command decisions have done as much to decide
the outcomes of battles as have the great decisions. Some poor decisions were
based on poor or inadequate information; other decisions, one could postulate,
have been made by commanders who were incapable of making a reasonable de-
cision given the duress under which they acted.
Although the actions of some of the greatest commanders have been well
documented, it would be infeasible to model patterns for future commanders in
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their footsteps. These 'great captains' represent only a small fraction of all
commanders.
Finally, since almost all battlefield systems are severely stochastic or in-
determinate [Ref. 8: p. 53], the C2 system must be capable of functioning within
these types of environments. To handle severely stochastic environments, the
command and control system must be capable of reacting to quick-response or
reduced-time situations. Part of this capability, especially at the lower levels of
command, rests personally within the commander's responsibility of establishing
a viable C2 system with which to implement a prescribed C2 process. Before de-
tailing the command and control process and describing how human factors are
conceptually interwoven into the process, a definition of human factors is appro-
priate.
B. HUMAN FACTORS DEFINED
The world of human factors comes in many different flavors but can be seen
to be primarily based on the interaction between the human-machine-
environment. For those who feel more comfortable with a strict definition, con-
sider the following:
"Human factors discovers and applies information about human behavior,
abilities, limitations, and other characteristics to the design of tools, ma-
chines, systems, tasks, jobs, and environments for productive, safe, com-
fortable, and effective human use." [ref. 10: p. 2]
As is easily discernible from this definition, the human factors arena is rather
large and can be applied anytime the situation has a human-in-the-loop.
Modification to the formal definition of human factors allows for consider-
ation oi only those factors that specifically impact on C2 decisions. Therefore, for
the purpose of this study, human factors are those factors that can psychologically
or pksiologically affect a soldier's will to fight in a combat environment.
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1. Physiological and Psychological Factors
Two fundamental schools of thought exist within the relatively large em-
pirical science of human factors: engineering-based and cognitivc-bascd.
Engineering-based human factors comprise the physical interface of the human
with the system or environment. These factors are physiological in nature. A
'system', as described here, is simply an entity that exists to carry out some pur-
pose. Engineering-based factors are typically the first things that come to mind
when one thinks of human factors and are characterized by some type of quan-
tifiable base from which to work. Hand sizes, subject height, muscular strength,
eye-hand coordination, and manual dexterity are all applicable descriptors for
this category [Ref. 6: pp. 12-13]. Sometimes called anthropometrics, this science
is defined as "the study of human body measurements, especially in comparison
with the layout of a system." [Ref. 1I: p. 51]
A 'system approach' bridges the gap between engineering-based and
cognitive-based factors.
"The concept of a system implies that we recognize a purpose: we carefully
analyze the purpose; we understand what is required to achieve the pur-
pose; we design the system's parts to accomplish the requirements; and
we fashion a well-coordinated system that effectively meets our purpose."
[Ref. 12: p. 192]
Since the human is a functional entity within the system, interaction between
humans, machines, and other entities within the environment should be consid-
ered in system design.
The cognitive-based human factors account for man's input into the sys-
tem. Cognitive factors account for factors which provide the psychological input
into the system. Factors within this category are generally less quantifiable than
their physical counterparts. Thought processes, such as decision-making, are
representative factors within this classification.
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2. The Starting List
Developing a list of applicable factors for consideration at the beginning
of this research study was critical. In order to ensure that the potentially impor-
tant factors were identified early in the research phase, an extensive literature
search was conducted through professional journals, research reports, and pub-
lished books. This search provided an initial working list of human factors. After
several sensing sessions with professors at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
who have conducted human factors research and a verbal query of NPS student
officers, the working list was refined and considered sufficiently comprehensive
to continue. An alphabetic listing of all of the human factors initially considered
is delineated below. Definitions of these came from a variety of sources. The
factors, as defined for this study, are listed in Appendix B.
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HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERED
Altitude Esprit de Corps Physical Conditioning
Attitude Excitement Physical Fatigue
Boredom Experience Primary Group
Cognitive Factor Fear Propaganda
Cohesion Fire Sleep Loss
Comradeship Frustration Social Motivation
Confinement Honor Soldier Load
Coordination Ideology Strength
Co%% ardliness Initiative Stress
Crowding Intuition Suppression
Culture Isolation Surprise
Darkness Jet Lag Terrain
Decision-making Leadership Toxicity
Dedication Mental Fatigue Training/
Depression Momentum Experience Leiel
Discipline Morale Uncertainty
Dri'e National Characteristics Values





C. THE IMPACT OF HUMAN FACTORS RESEARCH
Human factors research has had a profound effect on almost every human
being. From automobile display designs which attempt to optimize the cognitive
capabilities of the 'average' person to the design of a chair in an effort to provide
comfort and to minimize back stress [Ref. 6: pp. 5-12]. In the military context,
consideration of the human dimension has revolutionized the way that many de-
sign, organizational, and procedural problems are approached. Service sponsored
programs, such as the Army's MANPRINT, strive to consider the human as an
integral part of the overall system design. This research effort intends to add to
an already large foundation of human factors research. The focus is to identify
which factors a tactical commander perceives as the important factors and
whether or not the order of importance is situationally dependent.
How do the physiological and psychological aspects of human factors appear
to the commander in combat? Since combat is fundamentally stochastic in nature
with both forces motivated towards attaining specified objectives, the outcome
of a certain battle or phase of a battle is uncertain and can be thought of as a
probability distribution of outcomes. Commanding combat is somewhat analo-
gous to a two-player chess game; each player is trying to optimize his own posi-
tion while attempting to frustrate the opponent's attempts. Inherent in combat
are vulnerability, lethality, and the ability to spatially reposition one's forces.
Embedded in this philosophy of combat
"...is that combat is more than the actual physical clash of forces, also
having a psychological dimension. This psychological dimension can be
exploited by aiming to achieve a power distribution that gives the oppo-
nent the idea of being lost, and through causing mental paralysis and fric-
tion presenting to the opponent a problem that changes more rapidly than
he can respond." [Ref. 13: p. 63]
Research within the human factors discipline has potential for far-reaching




Two basic premises which provide the underpinnings for development of
a discussion on human factors integration into combat models are:
1. Models are abstractions of reality;
2. Combat is a human venture.
If models are to adequately reflect combat, they must have the inherent
capability to adequately represent man. Strictly defined, "a model is a simplified
representation of the entity it imitates or simulates." [Ref. 14: p. 1] Models can
be prescriptive, predictive, or descriptive.
* Prescriptive models are generally used to specify a course of action. These
models are characterized by solving problems and by telling the decision-
maker what to do or what course of action to pursue. Examples are linear
programs, dynamic programs, and game theory.
* Once models are found to adequately describe existing phenomena, they can
be used as predictive models to process other input data and arrive at a
predicted solution for a given situation.
" A descriptive model reproduces essential processes of the phenomenon that
it models. An example of this type of model is a combat simulation which
serves to emulate portions of a battle.
The key operative with respect to combat models is the word 'describe'. If these
models are expected to adequately describe what transpires in combat, the vari-
ability caused by man must be determined, quantified, and factored into the de-
scription. [Ref. 14: pp. 5-6]
Not only is the type of model important, but also the model's purpose.
Implementation of human dimensions within these combat models is heavily
based on the intended use of the model. Schroth, after an extensive literature
search, concluded that:
"Before human factors can be Incorporated into models, the model must
be well understood. This includes the model's purpose and structure. The
purpose is one of four types: technical evaluation, force structure analysis,
doctrinal analysis, and training. The structure is often quite complex. The
structure includes treatments of time and probability, the level of aggre-
gation, the processes, and the environment represented." [Ref. 15: p. 51]
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Why haven't human factors been fully integrated into combat models al-
ready? The answer, simply stated, is that human factors are much more difficult
to comprehend and much less tangible than other processes. Consider, for in-
stance, a firing engagement where System A is firing at System B. Theoretically,
it is much easier for an experienced combat modeler to model the ballistics of a
fired round, the probability of a hit, or the probability of a kill than it is to at-
tempt to model how much lead the 'average' user of System A will apply based
on the level of cohesion within his unit. Most people have a natural tendency to
focus on the 'things' which are understandable -- things that can be touched or
felt or diagrammed. As a result, human factors are generally avoided.
a. Establishing the Level
One of the primary components in establishing a valid 'set of rules'
concerning human factors integration is the development of .a hierarchical tree.
This hierarchy tree should reflect measurable factors and should allow for the
systematic construction of models which can be validated. In other words, start
with a small, understandable phenomenon and build from that point, maintain-
ing an understanding as to how each piece affects the overall model. Addi-
tionally, the hierarchy should provide logical representations of both physical
processes (e.g., target acquisition or firing accuracy) and cognitive processes (e.g.,
C decision-making). [Ref. 16: pp. 337-338] For the purposes of this study, these









Two arguments exist from selecting the company as the first observa-
ble level of command and control. The first argument is that the company-level
is too high and C1 decision-making occurs at the platoon (and possibly the squad)
level. Current U.S. Army doctrine addresses combat actions fought at the
squad,'platoon level as a series of combat drills. These drills, more commonly re-
ferred to as Battle Drills, provide a well-documented delineation of the standards
for the successful completion of combat actions in the face of an enemy force.
"These drills allow small units to link individual and leader tasks into co-
ordinated, efficient and effective group action. Drills provide the vital,
standardized plays which...units will use in combat." [ref. 17: p.41.
Rote, pre-rehearsed actions, the repetitive training of battle drills increases both
proficiency and cohesion. Battle drills are explicitly defined for combat arms
units.
As will be described in detail later, the C2 process can be applied when
viewed from a one-person perspective (i.e., the individual 'commands and con-
trols' himself). While this may be true, the fact remains that the individual sol-
dier drills on specified individual tasks until proficient. The individual skills are
doctrinally integrated to form squad and platoon drills; the platoons then become
maneuver elements for the commander to apply at the critical place and time.
A second argument for refuting the company-level as the C2 decision
start point is that company-level is too low and that real C2 decisions occur only
at higher echelons. The performance of front-line soldiers in the heat of battle
can collectively determine the effectiveness of higher echelon units. Therefore, it
can be argued that a brigade or division's effectiveness depends on the fighting
ability at the company level. Within the context of AirLand Battle doctrine,
leadership at battalion-level and higher is generally displayed through the mas-
tery of maneuvering forces and synchronizing the battlefield, much as a musical
conductor orchestrates a symphony. Alternatively, at the company-level and be-
low, soldiers are motivated by their leaders. A company commander, if he is
performing his duties, should know every soldier within his command. In fact, "it
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is at the company-level and below that human factors play an important role in
determining how well a soldier fights." [Ref. 18: p. 7]
In retrospect, any position can be argued as to the level where com-
mand and control is initiated. For the purposes of this study, command and
control will begin at the company level.
b. Establishing Cause and Effect Relationships
"If we are to work within the sphere and spirit of science, we must aim
to describe the phenomenon of combat in such a way that cause and effect can
be related." [Ref. 19: p. 0-3] Consider a combat action which occurs over speci-
fied amount of time. Over the course of the battle, decisions are made by
commanders on both sides which, in turn, cause other events or actions to occur.
The overall outcome of the battle is now driven by more than one decision. In
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Figure 1. Cause and Effect Audit Trails
The effect is the battle outcome. Through the use of a computer-
driven combat simulation model, it is possible to stop the battle after a certain
amount of time (At) and gather data representing the 'state' of the battle (e.g.,
forces remaining, ground gained or lost, killer-victim scoreboards) at this time.
This data is frequently numerical, although graphical displays to depict relative
unit positions at battle termination are useful. Given numerical output, the effect
is in a form that is overt and measurable.
The cause is a command and control decision. Under normal cir-
cumstances, more decisions are possible given a larger At. As shown, the audit
trail from the first C2 decision out to battle termination can have several
branches. If these branches and their relationships are not understood, cause and
effect is difficult to establish.
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Given the opportunity to simulate the same battle twice, what is the
effect on battle outcome if the commander is replaced? Likewise, if a Measure
of Effectiveness (MOE) is defined, to what extent does the MOE change due to
the change in the decision-maker? In essence, replacing the commander changes
the human factors composition of the individual making the decision. As a result,
one could postulate that a new decision-maker might consider different 'things'
when making a decision. It is conceivable for two commanders to make the same
decision even though different variables were considered. Similarly, it is possible
for. two different commanders considering different variables and making differ-
ent decisions to produce the same value for the MOE at battle termination. In
part, the difficulty in attempting to isolate the effects of 'good' or 'bad' command
and control lies in the chaotic and stochastic nature of the battlefield.
c. Oicrr the Obstaclcs
Given that the interaction of human factors is multifaceted and af-
fects every phase of a force-on-force confrontation, the weighting and/or consid-
eration of human factors can be broken down to two primary issues. First, one
must identify the pertinent human factors which most affect the commander in his
formulation of a C2 decision. Since the commander is part of the overall envi-
ronment, the human factors which the commander possesses (those which are
inherent), are also displayed to varying degrees by the soldiers under his com-
mand. This is one of the primary assumptions of this study and, as such, will be
re-addressed periodically throughout. For the moment, consider two human
factors: fatigue and stress. Although the commander personally shoulders the
responsibility of command, his measurable level of these factors should not differ
significantly from those of his soldiers, assuming that he has been commanding
his soldiers as a leader (as opposed to a manager). For factors like training, he
has individually undergone much more in-depth and enriched leadership training
and, as a result, one would expect any measurable capability with regards to
leadership knowledge to be higher.
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Second, and more importantly, once the pertinent factors have been
identified, one must devise reasonable techniques for measuring the inherent levels
possessed by individuals if the effects of human factors are to be determined. An-
other hurdle which is related to measurement includes the isolation of the factors,
the determination as to which factors interact, and the methodology for how that
interaction occurs. Shortcomings in measuring these human factors occur for one
of several reasons:
* Practicality - it may be that the factor which has been identified as 'impor-
tant' is impractical to measure. A conceptual measurement tool may not ex-
ist which allows for economical attainment of an answer once an experiment
is conducted. This is a cost-effectiveness issue that poses the question -- Can
enough information be gained to make the expenditure of resources worth-
while? Another potential shortcoming occurs due to technical limitations --
How do we measure fear? In many cases our societal values prohibit the use
of human guinea pigs to attain information that may be useful for future
combat effectiveness.
" Technological Restrictions - the primary question here is: Is the instrumen-
tation available to capture what you want? The current technological base
may limit our understanding of the chemical/electrical interworkings of the
brain and, as a result, will only allow us to give a 'best guess' with respect
to how the human mind functions.
Innumerable tests have been conducted in the past in an attempt to
quantify human factors. The secrecy of these tests was, in part, derived from a
concern for national security. This shroud of secrecy has also allowed for avoiding
public scrutiny with 'what' was being tested and 'how' the tests were being con-
ducted. Pcter Watson, who produced a comprehensive study on the psychology
of war, addresses one of the side-effects of secrecy being that studies:
"...do not always conform to the accepted scientific standards. In 1962, for
example, Mitchell Berkun, working at the Human Resources Research Of-
fice, conducted a series of experiments aimed at exploring whether troops
could be battleproofed by making their training so stressful that they would
enter battle inured to any fears. In one experiment men flew in an aircraft
which 'developed' an 'engine fault'. In another, men were 'accidentally' led
into a 'shelling zone'." [Ref. 20: p. 30]
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d. Integration of Human Factors - An Approach
What methodology can be used to integrate human factors into com-
bat models? Currently, there is no patented solution to this dilemma. There are,
however, many potential theories for the 'best' approach. Regardless of the
methodology followed, the results must satisfy the analytical community, the be-
havioral science community, and the military-user community. One possible ap-















Figure 2. Approach to Hmnan Factors Integration
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2. Training and Doctrine
Given recent events in Europe and the perceived reduction of the threat
posed by the Warsaw Pact, United States force reductions are inevitable. Like-
wise, deployments and actual 'field training' days will also be reduced due to fis-
cal constraints. The mere expense of one battalion-level rotation at the National
Training Center (NTC), ranging from S4 million to S6 million [Ref. 21: p. 21, will
become less tolerable, forcing a shift in training philosophy to a more economical
solution. One way to lessen the effects of reduced funding is through realistic
simulation devices.
Simulation devices cover the spectrum from reduced caliber firing
dcvices,'ranges to computer-driven combat models. Whatever the means, these
training devices must be as realistic as possible from a user's perspective. Againi,
in order to attain realism, the human dimension must be heavily considered dur-
ing model development.
As technological advancements increase the level of sophistication in
modern weaponry, doctrine will change to maximize the utility of weapon sys-
tems. Just as it would make no sense to develop a weapon system without con-
sidering human interface, it makes no sense to develop doctrine without
considering man's role and capabilities within the proposed doctrinal environ-
ment. If, given better prediction tools, human behavior can be adequately simu-
lated, applications to optimize the doctrinal man-machine-environment mix are
theoretically possible.
D. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS
The command and control process provides a contextual basis for the appli-
cation of human factors. As such, it will serve as a focal point for understanding
the impact of human factors. A representative model which demonstrates the
C2 process was selected for analysis within this study. Again, given that models
emulate real-world phenomena, the focus of the study is not the functional design
of the model, but rather how and where human factors impact on the model.
22
I. Lawson Command and Control Process Model
A simplified approach to diagrammatically representing the C2 process is
a model attributed to Dr. Joel S. Lawson, Sr. In his report entitled "The State
Variablcs of a Command and Control System" [Ref. 22: pp. 93-99], he defines
five basic functions of the process along with external interfaces. This model,







Figure 3. Lawison Loop
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a. Defining the Model
The Lawson C1 model is applicable to the highest levels of resolution.
Consider, for instance, a person in a dark hallway who is trying to find a doorway
(assume that no light switch is available). He knows that the door is on his right
so he lets his hand touch the right side wall as he senses (tactile) for the opening
that represents the doorway. As he moves down the hallway, the raw data from
his senses is processed and is then compared to what he expects to find (depend-
ing on whether the door is open or closed). After comparing the processed infor-
mation, he decides whether he has reached the doorway. If the decision is no, he
acts by continuing down the hallway, and as a result, re-enters at the top of the
Lawson loop. If the answer is yes, then the "Desired State" changes; he must now
determine whether the door is open or closed. As a result, the Lawson loop is re-
entered with the new desired state variables.
This example shows the Lawson model used in a discrete, stepwise
manner -- sense, process, compare, decide, act. Two inherent facets of the model
are that it is both continuous and recursive. The model represents a continuous
process in that each function occurs and is succeeded by the following step. It
should be noted that any or all of the functions can be ongoing at any instant.
Second, from a military organizational standpoint, the Lawson loop is rccursi'e
in the sense that each level of command within a military organization is engaged
in its own C2 process. If these C processes were represented by a series of cogs,
the higher echelon commands (i.e. corps or division-level) could be represented
by comparatively large cogs which turn slowly in comparison to the speed of
revolutions at the lower levels (i.e. company-level).
Returning to the model itself, each of the functions represents a cer-
tain type of activity being performed. This study focuses primarily on tactical C 2
decision-making and, as such, the functions along with a description and tactical
application examples are as indicated in Table I.
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Table I. COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS
Function Description Example
* Corresponds to all
- Corespods toall Soldier with a set of binoculars
SENSE data-gathering activities aSd w a eo bnua
- Extracts signals from data and a radio (FO)
- Acts upon signals to extract meaning . The 'human brain'
PROCESS from them * Database development at
- Transposes 'raw' data to usable higher echelons
information
COMPARE * Compares current state (or actual) . The 'human brain'of the em'ironment to the desired state . Graphics displavs
DECIDE . Determines what should be done to The commander's primary rolemove actual state to desired state
ACT . Executes the decision • Subordinate units
b. Applying Human Factors
Consider human factors within the context of the previously given
definition: those factors that can psychologically or physiologically affect a sol-
dier's will to fight in combat. In developing the discussion within this section, the
focus is on the 'generic' human factors and not on specific factors.
Each function within the Lawson C2 process model is affected by hu-
man factors. The SENSE function, since it really represents how the sensor per-
ceives a given stimulus, is susceptible to all factors, particularly psychological
factors. The perceived truth (how something is perceived) can be exactly opposite
from the ground truth (how it really exists). The PROCESS function receives the
raw data from the sensors and then compiles, de-conflicts, and synthesizes
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meaningful information which has meaning. Since this study concentrates on
human factors, assume that the processing is being done by people. Manual
processing allows for the full range of human errors. A great potential exists for
the processors to gloss over a seemingly insignificant part of a sensed report
which, in fact, was critically important to the commander. Likewise, personal
bias of the individual or group performing the processing may cause them to fo-
cus on a small point which is irrelevant to the information required. If a
commander is lucky, mistakes made during both the sense and process functions
will cancel each other rather than cascade.
As part of the COMPARE function, the information which has been
processed, representing the current state of the environment is compared to the
desired state. In a tactical environment, the desired state is derived through a
combination of:
* Specified missions from higher;
* Implied missions from higher;
o Next higher commander's intent;
• Internal analysis of the situation (via sensed data);
* Analysis of warfighting doctrine.
All of these things considered, the commander determines how he
would like the environment to exist and expresses his desire to subordinates
through missions, orders, and intent. Here again, perception plays a major role.
One could hypothesize that as a commander attains seniority and is promoted to
higher levels of command, most of the variability in interpreting/creating the de-
sired state washes out due, if nothing else, to increased experience. Of course, at
the lower levels of command (i.e., company-level) the commander must, by the
nature of his position, personally process and compare the state of the environ-
ment with the desired state.
The commander, and only the commander, shoulders the responsibil-
ity to DECIDE the next course of action. The decision-making process involves
weighting alternative options to determine which is most likely to succeed given
the circumstances.
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Integral to this process is an analysis and weighting of some of the
more tangible entities that the commander must perform: he is here and he thinks
that the enemy force is there; his force size is X and he thinks the enemy's force
size is Y; the sun rises at 0530 hours and will set at 1900 hours. In many situ-
ations, uncertainty of specific aspects of the operation cause the decision-maker
to hesitate. A subtle difference should be noted between uncertainty and igno-
rance. With ignorance, the information is available to the decision-maker but is
not used. With uncertainty, the information is not available or if it is, there is
considerable uncertainty as to its quality.
The factors listed above represent some factors that the commander
might consider important and which he might consider in the formulation of a
decision. Somewhere, in the formulation of his decision, human factors enter into
the final decision equation, perhaps as a subconscious contributor. The decision
then becomes a function of the conscious weighting of tangible factors and the
subconscious weighting of human factors. This is a "black and white" approach
to how human factors are really considered; human factors might be part of both
the conscious and subconscious considerations.
At the lower echelons of command, the compare and decide functions
are probably combined into a three step process:
1. Determine the desired state;
2. Identify and evaluate various alternative ways to reach this desired state;
3. Select one of the alternative ways.
Particularly at the company level, this combination of steps is done out of neces-
sity since the company commander, who is tasked with the most immediate re-
sponsibility, is organized without a formal staff.
The ACT function serves to implement the decision. This function is
initiated by the dissemination of orders from the commander. The function may
be served by adjusting the desired state in this loop or it may initiate or adjust
C2 processes at subordinate leader levels. One of the key facets of this function
is the responsiveness of the individual or unit taking the action.
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2. Beware the Shortcomings
Prior to attempting to universally apply the Lawson C2 model, one must
account for the shortfalls inherent in the model. For instance, what about the
commander's ability to process information? The ability to process information
varies from individual to individual. This capability also varies within the indi-
vidual. Many studies within the area of information processing have been per-
formed. Many studies have been conducted to determine the individual's ability
to process information. Of notable mention is an article by George Miller which
places the number of negotiable variables of judgment at seven plus or minus two:
"There is a clear and definite limit to the accuracy with which we can
identify absolutely the magnitude of a unidimensional stimulus variable. I
would propose to call this limit the span of absolute judgment, and I
maintain that for unidimensional judgment this span is usually somewhere
in the neighborhood of seven." [Ref. 23: p. 90]
Miller's focus on unidimensional stimuli must be expanded for use in a tactical
military context. Combat decisions rely on the commander's ability to sort
through a deluge of multivariate, multidimensional information. A research ef-
fort that focuses on information processing and C2 decision-makiug diverges out-
side the bounds of this study, however it is addressed here as another
consideration for variability among decision-makers.
Probably the greatest deficiency of the Lawson C2 model as described
abov.e is the absence of the enemy command and control process. This omission
tends to make the model appear one-sided. For the model to adequately describe
the C2 process, both the friendly and enemy command and control processes must
be simultaneously considered. This problem is addressed in subsequent deriva-
tions of the model. Known as the Lawson-Moose C2 model, this model ensures
that both forces operate within the same conceptual environment.
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E. AGGREGATION
Within the course of topic development, the authors have attempted to stay
relatively within the bounds of scientific methodology. For the purposes of the
discussion within the forthcoming section, the authors have taken literary license
to recognize (but not solve!) an extremely complex issue.
Strictly defined, aggregation is "the entire number, sum, mass, or quantity of
something." [Ref. 24: p. 53] For the purposes of this study, 'aggregation of fac-
tors' will be defined as the combination of several individual human factors. The
terms 'combination' and 'congregation' of factors are considered synonymous.
The term 'sum' as used here is a misnomer for two reasons. First, the contribut-
ing factors may not be consumed in the formation of the higher order effect.
Second, the contributing factors not only add to the higher order factor, but one
could postulate that there is an interaction or synergistic effect which makes the
whole greater than the sum of the individual parts.
Aggregation accounts for the first, second, and higher order effects of factors,
consider the factors fl1, f#1, fP3, and fl4. Each of these factors is individually in-
herent within the individual or independently exerts a certain level of 'force' on
the individual. These will be called 'first order effects'. Higher order effects are
the result of two or more of the factors combining to contribute an aggregate ef-
fect. This concept is depicted in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Higher Order Effects
Under the concept of aggregation, the individual first order effects may con-
tribute to a hgher order factor, albeit the contributor may not be consumed in
the process. For example, a factor such as stress can be affected by a number of









Figure 5. Contributing Factors
The multivariate combination of factors that impinge on other factors can be
invoked either separately or simultaneously. An experimental technique which
attempts to derive these interrelationships must ensure that the overlapping of
factors is controlled in order to predict outcome (effect) from the related human
factors (cause).
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F. HUMAN FACTORS MODELS
To establish a baseline from which to focus the research effort, an extensive
search was conducted to find potential models which categorized human factors.
Three models were analyzed in depth and were found to offer slightly different
approaches to categorizing human factors.
The first model categorizes human factors with respect to where (temporally)
the factor surfaced as a major player or 'big swinger' during a battle. The second
model classifies the factors based on whether the impact on performance is due
to changes inside or outside the soldier and the extent of change over a relative
period of time. Finally, the third model focuses on whom the factors affect and
the effect on combat potential,'combat power. It should be noted that these
models were created for different reasons and will be used as 'potential' ways to
categorize the factors identified within this study. Each model explains a separate
phenomenon.
1. Classified by Time
One method for classification of factors was developed by Schroth in a
study which has served as a primer for the incorporation of human factors into
combat models. After identifying candidate human factors through an extensive
literature search, the factors were divided into two broad areas of influence upon
man. The 'areas of influence' represented the time, relative to a battle, that the
factors would be most influential. The two categories are:
* Before,:After the battle;
* During the battle.
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Figure 6. Factors Applied Over Time in a Battle
The human factors chosen are those defined herein as aggregate factors.








Since the factors are not isolated down to the individual factor as defined
in the current study, direct application to combat models will pose immediate loss
of a cause and effect audit trail. This does not discard this classification
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technique as a valid model; the individual factors listed in the current study can
be categorized using this method.
2. Classified by Location and Endurance
In a study entitled "Soldier Dimensions in Combat Models" [Ref. 25: pp.
1-23], Dr Phillip L. Vandivier discusses and recommends techniques for inputting
soldier dimensions (human factors) information into computer models. By inte-
grating human factors, the models are expected to better reflect the real-world
situations through adjustment in light of the expected degradation due to soldier
performance. A background research effort identified 23 different soldier di-
mensions which showed a relationship with soldier performance during contin-
uous operations. Of the 23 selected for initial consideration, 19 factors were
isolated for use in the study. In the course of the research effort, a conceptual
model was developed which classified the factors with respect to their location
relative to the soldier (internal or external to the soldier) and their endurance
(length of time that the factor will prevail). The following terms were used to
characterize the factors:
ENDOGENOUS - describes activities and events that
occur within the soldier
EXOGENOUS - describes activities and events in the
environment that effect the soldier
TRANSITORY - the factor exists for a relatively short
duration, is transient, or is short lived
ENDURING - the factor exists for a relatively long time
or has a lasting duration
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Using these location and endurance descriptors, there are four resultant combi-
nations:




The conceptual model that depicts the classification of the factors con-
sidered by Vandivier is depicted in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Factors Applied by Source Location and Endurance
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One of the obvious advantages to this method of classification is the in-
herent discrete nature of the model. Discrete, as used here, indicates that the
human factors can be categorized with respect to their source location
(internal/external) and their endurance (relatively long or short duration). It
would be difficult to find many examples that straddle between categories.
3. Classified by Change in Unit Effectiveness
The final model selected for consideration was developed through a series
of discussions between the authors and Wayne P. Hughes (Capt, USN, Ret),
currently an operations analysis professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. The
foundation for this model is the categorization of human factors based on effects
resulting from changes in the factors. The effects, in this case, represent a change
in what Hughes opts to call 'combat potential' or 'combat power'. In order to
fully appreciate the contribution of this model, a basic understanding of the
underlying theory of combat potential and power is important.
The theory of combat in this section was developed by The Military
Conflict Institute and expanded by Hughes in his paper "Command and Control
Within the Theory of Combat" [Ref. 26: pp. 1-53]. The basic premise of the
theory is that combat is a complex interaction of force-on-force activities. Combat
potcntial is the capacity of a given force to engage successfully in combat against
an enemy. Combat potential is one of two types: designed or available. Designed
combat potential is the result of optimal training, equipment, motivation, organ-
ization, and leadership, whereas available combat potential results from the unit's
current capacity given the unit's state of training, equipment, motivation, organ-
ization, and leadership. Combat power is the lethal effectiveness delivered by
forces as result of those forces being activated against an enemy. This is a result
of forces engaging enemy forces at a given time and location
Paramount to understanding this theory of combat is the awareness that
combat potential is transformed to combat power through the commander's ac-
tivation of his forces utilizing the C2 process. As described earlier, human factors
can have a profound effect on the command and control process. Within the
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context of Hughes' theory of combat, factors which cause changes to human fac-
tors are generated from one of four categories:
* Externai origin geneiated by nature;
* External origin generated by the enemy;
* External psychological origin generated by friendly forces;
* External psychological origin generated by enemy forces.
These factors can effect the individual or unit (or both) in one of three
ways. From the individual soldier perspective, the effects manifest themselves
through:
* Physical changes - caused by factors internal to the soldier which effect his
physical abilities. Examples are a soldier's load, fatigue, and physical condi-
tioning.
* Psychological changes - caused by external factors which effect the soldier's
cognitive processes and abilities. For instance, increased training is designed
to build the soidier's mental confidence in his personal abilities.
* Spiritual changes - caused by external factors, these pertain to the immaterial
nature of man and are normally considered as part of the 'soul' or inner
man. An example of this category of factors can be represented by d, -rip-
tors such as the "will to win".
With these definitions, the model as proposed by Hughes is depicted in Figure 8.
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G. REVIEW OF ISSUES
A summary of the background information presented is in order prior to de-
lineating the experimental design. Therefore, the following represent the cogent
points of this section:
" The C' process within an indeterminate or chaotic environment provides the
scenario backdrop for the purposes of this study.
" Human factors, as defined, are of two basic types: physiological and psy-
chological.
" Combat models emulate the combat environment. As such, combat models
should adequately reflect the human dimension.
" The command and control process is comprised of five functions: sense,
process, compare, decide, and act. At lower echelons of command, the com-
pare and decide functions are normally personally performed by the
commander.
" Aggregation of factors should be avoided at the onset of experimentation if
clear cause and effect audit trails are to be established.
" There are a multitude of models available to classify or categorize human
factors. Of these, the three reviewed were:
a Classified by when the factor most impacted on a battle;
a Classified by whether the change occurs internal or external to the human
and based on the endurance of the factor;
0 Classified by the effect on the unit or individual with the subsequent im-
pact on the unit's combat effectiveness.
These developmental points provide the basis for the experimental design. As
such, each was partially implemented in defining the method for determining
those factors affecting a commander's decision in a tactical environment.
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The common thread which provides the substance of this study is the deter-
mination of those human factors that impact on the commander as a decision-
maker. The experimental design and process used to determine those factors is
the subject of this section. There are several candidate methodologies which
might be used to address this issue. After discussion of their advantages and dis-
advantages, this section provides an in-depth examination of the approach used
in this research.
A. DATA COLLECTION METHODS
As previously stated, quantifying a qualitative entity is difficult. In selecting
an approach within the bounds of scientific methodology, the primary question
with respect to this study is: What are the options available to isolate the inpor-
tant human factors? The answer is that there are three primary methods, all
bearing their own degree of merit. Each of the research techniques described here
was considered as a viable research option. A brief explanation along with the
advantages and disadvantages are presented.
1. Historical Combat Accounts
Probably the most prolific source of literature involving human factors in
combat has resulted from the work of historians, behavioral scientists, and sol-
diers gathering data from combatants after a battle/combat action or reflecting
on historical accounts of combat action. Examples can be attained through ex-
amining the research efforts and works of authors such as S.L.A. Marshall, and
Trevor Dupuy. There is no doubt that the efforts of these authors have revolu-
I S.L.A. Marshall (BG, USAR, Retired), served as a combat historian in World War II,
Korea, and Vietnam. His books include The River and the Gauntlet and Pork Chop Hill. Probably
his most recognized work was Men Against Fire which examined and emphasized the importance
of the often forgotten and misu lderstood figure: the American combat soldier. His research tech-
niques focussed on interviewing combatants fresh from battle.
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tionized current thinking with respect to the attention paid to the human aspects
of combat systems, processes, and organizations. In fact, in a paper addressing
the modeling of human behavior in combat, Dupuy states:
"...to study human reaction in a battlefield environment we have no choice
but to go on the battlefield, not the laboratory, not the proving ground, not
the training reservation. But because of the nature of the very character-
istics of combat which we want to study, we can't study them during the
battle. We can only do so retrospectively." [Ref. 27: p. 3]
There are some potential detriments to acquiring data from historical in-
cidents. The first potential shortcoming is in the perishability of the data.
Marshall (and others) attempted to capture the information while it was still
'fresh' by interviewing soldiers immediately after a battle. One can postulate that
as the time from event conclusion to interview increased, the clarity of the ac-
count of how the action occurred decreased -- that is human nature. Additionally,
talk among soldiers may further confuscate the recollection. The second potential
shortcoming is the individual who is providing the account. The soldiers who
survi'ed the battle are the subjects. What of those who did not survive? What
were they doing right or wrong? What factors might have been involved or to
what degree did they possess certain attributes that may have caused them to
place themselves in danger?
Of final consequence is that data obtained from combat is real but rough.
That is due, in part, to the multivariate and chaotic nature of combat. With re-
spect to obtaining data from combat, Hughes (et al.) states:
"The existence of combat data should not lead to an overestimation of its
precision and value. Wartime analysts emphasized the need for personal
presence and observation to understand not only the nature of the data but
the nature of the operation. Morse and Kimball's famous 'hemibel think-
ing,' the search for a threefold difference between postulated and ob-
served results, was based in part on the coarseness of the data, in part on
a compelling desire to find areas of big improvement." [Ref. 14: p. 26]
42
2. Training Exercises
Field exercises or training exercises have the potential to provide a wealth
of useful data. In planning these exercises, commanders attempt to emulate con-
ditions which might confront their soldiers in combat. In doing so, many of the
battlefield processes (i.e., force maneuver, fire planning, C2) are stressed. With
respect to the current study, there are two major drawbacks to using training ex-
ercises for determining the most important factors affecting a commander's deci-
sion:
1. The lack of experimental robustness, and
2. The isolation from the mental terror experienced under actual combat con-
ditions.
Field exercises under similar conditions can be partially reproduced, but
the resource expense significantly increases with the size of participating units.
As a result, collection of data is usually a by-product and not the main focus of
most field training exercises. Missions are infrequently repeated which narrows
the range of conditions over which causal/effect relationships can be surmised.
This, in turn, lessens the range of conditions to which any findings can be applied
and decreases the utility or robustness of a derived model.
A second drawback is that 'actual battlefield conditions' are essentially
irreproducible. The cumulative stress or fatigue associated with continuous com-
bat operations; the adrenalin 'high' and its related physiological impacts; the
mental anguish experienced from treating wounded or dying comrades; the dev-
astating effects of modern weaponry -- these aspects cannot be experienced in a
peacetime training environment. Even with the addition and integration of direct
fire training systems such as MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement
System), a soldier's mental frame of mind is likely to be such that if he is killed,




In designing qualitative research, there are two fundamental techniques
which provide the core of data collection: personal observation and in-depth
interviewing. These techniques are used in collecting data in both combat and
exercise environments and are supplemented by more specific techniques charac-
terized by:
1. Questionnaires and surveys
2. Films, photographs, and videotapes
3. Projective techniques and psychological testing
For the most part, these supplemental techniques range the spectrum of
subjectivity. Subjective influence may be interjected early in the data collection
process (as seen in surveys) or later (as demonstrated in the subjective analysis
of psychological tests). Although potential research avenues with respect to hu-
man factors exist in all of the supplemental techniques, the scope is narrowed to
consider the questionnaire or survey as the instrument of choice. [Ref. 28: pp.
79-87]
Questionnaires and surveys allow the researcher to make inferences about
a large number of people from data which is drawn from a relatively small num-
ber of individuals from that group. In fact, a survey "is the preferred method if
the researcher wished to obtain a small amount of information from a large
number of subjects [Ref. 28: p. 84]." As such, the survey serves its basic aim by
statistically describing and explaining the variability of certain facets or dimen-
sions of the population. Surveys have several basic strengths including their:
"...accuracy, generalizability, and convenience. Accuracy in measurement
Is enhanced by quantification, replicability, and control over observer ef-
fects. Survey results can be generalized to a larger population within
known limits of error. Surveys are amenable to rapid statistical analysis
and comparatively easy to administer and manage." [Ref. 28: p. 85].
There are also inherent weaknesses in survey instruments. With respect
to human factors research, a survey would strive to provide the basis of inference
encompassing those factors that commanders think are important. In essence, the
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fallability of surveys are that they require humans to judge which factors they
perceive to be important.
B. THE RESEARCH APPROACH
Given the advantages and disadvantages of each of the techniques described
above, a subjective approach using surveys as the research instrument was de-
termined as the most appropriate. As such, the thrust of the experimental design
was twofold. First, isolate those factors which might affect a commander's deci-
sion. By 'affect', consideration is given to those factors which would impact on
a commander's decision -- those which the commander consciously or subcon-
sciously considers in the form'ulation of his decision. Second, of the most impor-
tant factors identified in the exploratory experiment, determine whether the
tactical situation or context changes the relative order of significance.
The sample population for the survey was drawn from students at the Naval
Postgraduate School. Using these officers provided a wide variety of military
background and experience. As with any survey, the honesty and accuracy of the
respondents' replies must be depended upon in order to infer population charac-
teristics from the sample responses.
The steps taken to answer the research questions comprise the remainder of
this section and are summarized in the following outline.
1. A categorization model was chosen from those presented in the previous of
the thesis. The selected model enabled the factors to be categorized by source
location and endurance [Ref. 25]. Using this model as a base, the research
effort was focussed solely on endogenous factors which reduced the initial
61 factors (Appendix B) to a more manageable quantity of 27 factors.
2. Next, since survey design and required output from the survey are insepara-
ble, the potential methods for quantifying the qualitative nature of the sur-
vey data were explored. Of the four techniques considered, the Categorical
Judgment Technique was judged as the most appropriate technique. The
output of the technique provides an interval scale.
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3. Survey design was critical to establishing the validity of the research effort.
As eluded to in the Introduction of the study, there were two primary sur-
veys used.
* Survey I or the Initial Survey focussed on determining which of the fac-
tors would impact on the commander as the decision-maker. With the
exception that the 'decision' was specified as a reduced-time command
and control decision, the scenario in which to apply the human factors
was essentially generic or dimensionless.
* Survey II or the Follow-On Survey was designed to determine whether
the scenario in which the factors were considered would alter the relative
order of the factors.
4. As a final explanatory step to the research method, a numerical 'walk-
through' of the categorical judgment technique is provided at the end of this
section. Since a majority of the calculations were performed through the use
of computer algorithms, this example will serve to assist the reader in
understanding how the interval scales were constructed.
C. NARROWING THE SCOPE
Reducing the quantity of variables involved in an experiment is critical when
a large number of variables are involved. Coupled with reduction is categori-
zation. Of the models reviewed in the previous of this study, the model developed
by Dr. Phillip Vandivier [Ref. 25: pp. 1- 23] was selected for use in this study.
This model offered the simplest approach to discrete categorization of the factors.





With the factors categorized, the guideline of considering only those factors
which are endogenous was invoked. Why only endogenous factors? Besides al-
lowing for an immediate reduction in variables, the primary reason for this re-
striction is that these factors are internal to the human or are only apparent
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within groups. As such, the endogenous factors are not as understandable as ex-
ternal variables, yielding wide latitude in the research approaches used to isolate
the important variables.
Factors organic to an exogenous source tend to affect a soldiers with respect
to a change in time required to perform a specified task. For instance, consider
two units operating within two distinct external environments: one in a non-
chemically contaminated environment, the other in a fully contaminated chemical
environment. With all other things being equal, if the unit within the chemical
environment has been properly trained to withstand the physiological and psy-
chological rigor associated with that type of environment, one could expect that
unit's performance to nearly parallel the unit operating in uncontaminated con-
ditions. Proper advance planning by commanders and prior training of the unit
can serve to diminish and compensate for the difficulties experienced by a change
of environmental or exogenous factors.
The other reason for steering clear of exogenous factors is that, in many cases,
these can be considered as dependent variables. That is, these factors are some-
times considered as the cause for a change in the level of internal attributes. For
instance, increasing a soldier's load or a change in altitude eliits other physio-
logical and psychological responses.
Given this narrowed scope, the factors which can be categorized into either
endogenous/transitory or endogenous.'enduring are as depicted in Figure 9. This

























Figure 9. Factors Impacting on Command and Control Decisions
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D. QUANTITATIVE METHODS
In designing the survey instruments, the available methods for reduction and
quantization of subjective responses were reviewed. The purpose of this review
was to find the technique which would provide, as its output, an interval scale.
An interval scale was preferred to an ordinal ranking since the interval scale
provides a spatial distribution along with the relative order of the factors. During
the process of determining the most effective technique for quantifying the fac-
tors, four methods were considered: a continuous response scale, the paired
comparison test, ordinal judgments, and categorical judgments. Each is briefly
discussed below.
I. Continuous Response Scale
A Continuous Response Scale allows subjects to rank instances (human
factors) on a scale from 0 to 100. This ranking is based on the feelings of the
subjects making the ranking. This approach is analogous to a one-way classifica-
tion in the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) which is often used to determine
interrelationships. However, subjects may find it extremely hard to make a judg-
ment on a continuous scale. Additionally, intervals between the ranks could not
be established and, as a result, this method was not used. [Ref. 29: p. 46]
2. Paired Comparison Test
The method of Paired Comparisons asks subjects to compare two in-
stances or human factors and determine which possess the greater value. To use
this method each instance is paired with another instance. Thus, given n in-
n(n-l)
stances, there are 2 possible pairings. For the Initial Survey, designed to
determine the most important of 27 human factors, this technique would require27(27-1)
the subject to compare 2 = 351 instances. For such a large number of
instances it would be infeasible to accurately make useful comparisons. There-
fore, this method was not selected. [Ref. 29: pp. 166-168]
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3. Ordinal Judgments
The Ordinal Scale method asks subjects to rank or order instances based
on their feelings. There are no assumptions made, however, regarding the dis-
tance or spatial distribution between the instances. Due to the number of in-
stances included in the Initial Survey (27), a subject may not be able to
distinguish between two instances. For one reason or another, some subjects may
not rank all of the instances thereby creating an invalid ranking. As a result, this
method was determined to be less than desirable. [Ref. 29: p. 19]
4. Categorical Judgments
Categorical judgments require respondents of questionnaires to select the
category they deem as best representing an instance. This method is a scaling
technique which uses the categorical ratings of the respondents and constructs an
interval scale. This scale includes both the instances and the bounds or intervals
between the categories. As such, the categorical bounds are discretely defined on
the final scale. The categories are understood to be a mutually exclusive set of
successive intervals. Also these categories are listed in such a manner that the
categories are placed in ascending order. One example of categorical judgments
is the method by which students rate instructors as poor, fair, average, excellent,
or outstanding. In this example, the possible rating levels are the categories and
the instructors are the instances. Another example of a categorical judgment is
the ranking of military officers on fitness reports. [Ref. 30: p. 1]
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E. SURVEY I DEVELOPMENT
The initial focus of the experimental procedure was to determine which of the
human factors would impact on a commander making a C2 decision. To establish
the rank order of importance for the categorized human factors, a judgmental
questionnaire (Initial Survey or Survey I) was designed to be distributed to offi-
cers attending advanced study curricula at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).
The designed intent of the survey was the identification of the most important
factors for use as input in the Follow-On Survey.
Officers from each of the four services (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps,
Navy) were queried through the Initial Survey. This 'joint' approach was used
solely to determine whether responses or order varied by service. Even though the
vast majority of the respondents were non-combat veterans, the sample popu-
lation reflected a wide variety of background experience with expertise in both
staff and command positions. Distribution included all assigned officers in the
Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, while one of every four naval officers was
randomly selected for participation based on the disproportionate number of na-
val officers attending NPS.
1. Survey Design
The Initial Survey was designed to allow respondents to logically cate-
gorize the human factors in the simplest manner possible. The survey consisted
of three parts:
Part I - Demographics/Special Instructions
Part II Questionnaire
Part III - Open Statement/Respondent Comments
In addition, a cover letter was included which provided an explanation of the
purpose of the study and the intended use of the findings. A description of each
part of the survey is outlined below, while a sample copy of the actual survey is
included in Appendix C.
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a. Demographics/Special Instructions
The first part of the survey consisted of two parts: demographics and
special instructions. The demographic information was requested in order to es-
tablish the background characteristics of the sample population. The basic de-
mographic information consisted of the respondents' service, pay grade, branch
of service, time spent in command, and time spent as a staff officer. Additionally,
each respondent was queried as to his combat experience; this was included to
determine if a large enough sample was available to detect a difference between
the responses of combat and non-combat veterans. Since less than one percent
of the respondents had served in a combat environment, this information was not
used in further analysis.
The special instructions were intended to ensure that all respondents
began the survey with the same basic understanding of how to categorize the
listed human factors. The scenario or context was intentionally left open-ended,
allowing the respondent to apply the human factors in accordance with his per-
sonal experience. In addition, this 'dimensionless' environment ensured that no
branch or service bias was introduced into the survey.
The driving point of the special instructions was that the human fac-
tors wcre to be categorized based on a reduced-time, operational command and
control decision. The terminology of 'reduced-time' was used to distinguish this
type of combat decision from a planning or organizational decision -- a decision
that must be made within seconds or minutes as opposed to a decision where time
is of little or no consequence. In many cases, the amount of time that a
commander has to consider a course of action may influence how he will make
that decision.
Ensuring that the decision-maker is confronted by this type of 'crit-
ical' decision also assists in isolating the way that a first order human factor is
perceived. For example, consider the factor cohesion. As depicted in Figure 10,
the level of cohesion that a unit possesses varies with time. Theoretically, a
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reduction in the amount of time given the decision-maker should reduce the var-
iance of an inherent factor level such that the factor can be specified instantane-










Figure 10. Level of Factor - Instantaneous versus Over Time
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b. Questionnaire
The questionnaire portion of the survey consisted of the research
question, the judgment categories, and the 27 human factors under consideration.
Since the judgment category descriptors and the research question are so inti-
mately correlated, extensive care was taken to word the question in a manner that
elicited a logical response. The research question for Survey I was:
How important is each of these Human Factors (as possessed by the unit
or individuals withir, the unit) to a commander in his formulation of a
reduced-time operational command and control decision?
Since the categorical judgment technique was chosen as the analysis






In addition to providing discrete, mutually exclusive categories, the chosen de-
scriptors were selected such that the parallel wording ensured that the response
categorics were one standard deviation apart (based on normality of responses).
In most cases of categorical judgments, five categories are presented giving re-
spondents a category of 'neutrality'. The neutral category was intentionally
omitted from the Initial Survey to force respondents to commit to the fact that a
given factor either is important or is not important, thereby alleviating the po-
tential for 'middle-of-the-road' responses. [Ref. 31: p. 84]
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Each human factor was listed in the main body of the questionnaire
along with its definition. The definition was included to clarify the intended
meaning of the factor, thereby establishing a common basis of understanding.
Alphabetical ordering was used to avoid any potential for bias at the onset.
As with any categorical judgment survey, validity of the output is
highly dependent on the quality of the initial research question. Therefore, it is
necessary for the respondents to have a clear understanding of the research
question from the start [Ref. 28: p. 104]. As a result, the question is stated twice
early in the questionnaire and is reiterated at the beginning of each page.
c. Open Statement
Since this survey represents an exploratory 'pilot' research approach,
respondents were asked to list any additional human factors which they felt
would affect a commander in making a C2 decision. This provided an open-ended
ervironment where respondents could express their personal thoughts on human
facto % in command and control decision-making. The results from this portion
were used to tailor the Follow-On Survey.
F. SURVEY I1 DEVELOPMENT
\With the relative order of the factors affecting a commander's C2 decision-
making process delineated, the next logical step was to determine whether the
scenario or context to which the factors were applied would have a significant
impact. Recall in Survey I that the factors were applied in a 'dimensionless' en-
vironment. The methodology supporting the Follow-On Survey was to time-step
the respondent through a sequence of scenarios, invoking (out of necessity) some
of the exogenous factors purposely deleted from the Initial Survey.
Two versions of the survey were designed based on the experience and back-
ground of the authors. The first scenario, called the Infantry Scenario, focussed
on C2 decisions that an infantry company commander might be required to make
in a combat environment. The second scenario, called the Artillery Scenario con-
centrated on the C2 decisions that might confront an Artillpry battery commander
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in combat. The primary reason for scenario variation was the added determi-
nation as to whether the service branch (i.e., Infantry versus Field Artillery) and,
as a result, the decisions facing that type commander would significantly affect
the relative order of significance of the human factors. Both of these branches are
considered combat arms, generally operating in chaotic environments where
reduced-time decisions normally impact on the immediate outcome of a battle.
This two-pronged variation to the development and implementation of the





Figure I1. Folloi-On Survey Methodology
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Respondent selection for participants in Survey II was limited to Army stu-
dents assigned to advanced study curricula at the Na,,a] Postgraduate School
(NPS). This restriction was installed due to the fact that the respondents for this
particular survey should have some basic working knowledge of Army field op-
erations. The participants were divided such that Infantry-branched officers
completed the Infantry scenario, Artillery-branched officers completed the Artil-
lery scenario, with the remaining officers randomly split to ensure equal branch
representation to both scenarios.
The human factors which the respondents were to categorize consisted of the
seven most important factors as determined from the Initial Survey. The reason
for selecting only seven factors was (as will be seen in the Results section) that
these factors were the top seven for all services independent of the rank order.
1. Survey Design
As with the Initial Survey, the Follow-On Survey was designed to allow
respondents to logically categorize the human factors in the simplest manner
possible. The survey consisted of four parts:
Part I - Background
Part I1 - Task Force Scenario
Part III - Unit Situation/Sub-cases
Part IV - Special Information
As in the Initial Survey, a cover letter provided respondents the purpose of the
study and the intended use of the findings. A description of each part of the sur-
vey is outlined below while sample copies of the surveys are included in Appendix
D.
a. Background
The survey background information was intended to provide respondents with a
base from which to complete the survey. The background information empha-
sized the following points:
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* Perceived truth was assumed to be ground truth. In other words, the
friendly and enemy information provided in the survey is exactly how it ex-
ists on the ground. This was included to emphasize to respondents not to
unnecessarily 'wargame' the decision based on how they might perceive the
presented information.
* Since the scenario was written within a ground European theater context,
respondents were directed to assume that (for whatever reason) hostilities
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact were imminent.
* Probably the most important point of consideration, respondents were in-
formed that the authors realized that applying a list of human factors is not
normally done by decision-makers in a reduced-time environment. As previ-
ously stated, this is probably part of a subconscious weighting. As such, re-
spondents were directed to apply each factor individually.
* Since the scenario was designed as a time-step sequence, respondents were
directed not to change an answer once made.
* The overall general Brigade mission to which the respondent was assigned
was delineated.
In designing this survey, one self-imposed restriction was to try to
keep each sub-case on one sheet of paper. Since the emphasis was in portraying
an adequate decision context in which to apply the human factors, most of the
available page space was used for that purpose. As such, definitions of the human
factors under consideration were included as the last section of the background
information.
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b. Task Force Scenario
The task force scenario was intended to provide the respondents with
the basic 'tactical picture'. Included as part of this section are:
* Designation of the Battalion Task Force as well as the company/battery of
which the respondent is the commander.
* Information on the enemy to include current activity, potential, and proba-
ble courses of action.
* The Task Force Commander's intent, expectations, and Mission Oriented
Protective Posture (MOPP) guidance.
* Environmental considerations to include the terrain and weather within the
area of operation.
c. Unit Situation/Sub-Cases
The unit situation was designed to place the respondent within a
parametrically specified environment. The term unit, as used here, refers to either
an Infantry company or an Artillery battery. Specific items addressed as part of
the unit situation include:
* Specific unit organization
* General unit location in relation to the Inter-German Border
* Assigned unit mission, contingency mission, and current disposition (defen-
sive posture)
& General unit level of training with respect to the assigned and contingency
missions
* Initial unit readiness states (personnel and equipment).
In addition, respondents were asked to disregard the success or failure of the
Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) plan.2 This restriction was fore-
seen as necessary in order to isolate the respondents' thoughts specifically on the
tactical context and avoid unnecessary bias by those who feel that unit perform-
ance would decrease if the NEO plan fails.
2 The Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) plan is designed to providc non-
combatants (in particular, families accompanying service members in overseas locations) with a
plan for evacuation from a hostile or potentially hostile region.
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Another potential bias which was intentionally omitted was what the
authors have chosen to call 'map bias'. Given the same six or eight digit coordi-
nate and a topographic map which contains those coordinates, each individual
interprets the coordinates in a slightly different manner; many times people 'see'
different things when looking at the same terrain feature on a map. As a result,
general descriptions of tactical situations were preferred over specific map disp-
ositions.
The sub-cases or sub-scenarios (referred to herein as cases) comprised
the questionnaire portion of the survey. These cases represented four separate
and distinct scenarios that were presented in a time-stepped sequence, leading the
respondent through a series of tactical contexts. The four cases were essentially
parallel for both Infantry and Artillery scenarios. The Infantry cases are outlined
below.
Case Number I - The unit commander is required to quickly decide how to
modify his intended plan to secure two sites. The modification is necessary due
to the fact that his Executive Officer, who was going to supervise the security
of one of the sites (with the commander at the other) was medically evacuated.
Case Number 2 - One of the two platoons protecting the site where the
commander is located starts receiving heavy ground fire. The commander must
make the decision whether to deploy the reaction force in support of that
platoon.
Case Number 3 Two large rockets land 3 kilometers upwind from the
commander's location. Since the unit is currently in a reduced Mission Oriented
Protective Posture (MOPP), the commander must decide whether or not to go
to full MOPP and accept a degradation in defensive preparations.
Case Number 4 - A sister unit's defensive position sustained a direct hit with a
non-persistent nerve agent resulting in an estimated 110-115 casualties. The
battalion commander has directed the company commander to send one of the
platoon's from his current position to the sister unit's position to re-establish the
defense and assess, 'evacuate casualties. The battalion commander has also told
the company commander that he is to personally remain with the current site
security mission.
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As in Survey 1, the judgment categories and the research question
were intimately correlated, therefore extreme care was taken to word the question
in a manner that elicited a logical response given the judgment categories. The
research question for Survey II was:
How important is each of these human factors listed below (as possessed
by the unit or individuals within the unit) to you, as the commander, in the
formulation of this reduced-time decision?
Since the categorical judgment technique was the method chosen for analysis, the







The seven factors used in the Follow-On Survey were the most im-
portant factors identified by respondents of the Initial Survey. The factors were










As previously stated, the validity of output for this type of survey instrument is
highly dependent on the research question. Respondents must be able to clearly
identify the research question and, as such, the question is stated twice (in the
cover letter and in each sub-case) prior to the first required response.
d. Special Information
The special information consisted of two parts: demographics and
survey effectiveness. The demographics information was the same as that re-
quested for Survey I. The survey effectiveness portions asked respondents to
subjectively state their opinions as to the quality of the survey. Respondents were
asked to respond to the following questions:
" Were the situations presented understandable?
" Would you say that the situations presented were realistic?
" What assumptions did you have to make in order to complete this survey?
The information derived from the effectiveness questions was requested to facili-
tate improvements in future generations of this survey.
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G. THE TECHNIQUE OF CHOICE: CATEGORICAL JUDGMENTS
The categorical technique is a method that has been used in previous research
efforts conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. After careful consideration
of the requirement to have an interval scale as an end product, this technique was
deemed as the most suitable method for the transformation of the judgmental
responses. Four APL (A Programming Language) programs were used to ac-
complish the quantitative manipulation task. These programs (Appendix D) were
developed by Professor Glenn F. Lindsay, an operations research instructor at
the Naval Postgraduate School.
The procedure to derive the interval scale from judgmental responses will be
discussed in the next section. There are four assumptions which must be consid-
ered in using this technique:
1. A respondent's 'feelings' about the scale value of n instance (human
factor) i is a normally distributed random variable with mean U, and
variance o.
2. Respondents view the continuum of values for instances as being broken
into successive intervals called categories.
3. A respondent's feeling about a category upper bound is a normally dis-
tributed random variable so that for categoryj, the upper bound would
be normally distributed with mean p, and variance a,.
4. All category bounds have the same variance, so that for all j, ac = c.
[Ref. 30: pp. 6-7]
1. Step-by-step interval scale development
The mathematical procedure used to establish an interval scale is thor-
oughly and clearly described, along with examples, in Professor Lindsay's paper
[Ref. 30]. The following is a brief outline of the steps involved it. the procedure.
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1. Arrange the raw frequency data in a table where the rows are instances (human
factors) and the columns the categories. Columns should be in rank order,
with Column 1, the leftmost column, representing the least favorable category
and the most favorable category in the rightmost column.
2. Compute relative cumulative frequencies for each row, and record these in a
new table. This table is referred to as the P array and all values of p,1 > 0.98
and p, < 0.02 are removed to avoid undue influence by a small number of re-
spondents. This creates a n by (m-k) array, where k is the number of columns
removed.
3. Treating these values as leftward areas under a Normal (0,1) curve, go to a
table of the Normal distribution and find the z values for these areas. Record
these in a new n by (m-k) table. This is the z,, array for the computations
which follow.
4. For each row i in the zY array, compute the row average, i,.
5. For each colunm j in the z, array, compute the column average. Call these
colunm averages b,, and note that b, is the value of the upper bound of cate-
gory j on the scale.
6. Compute a grand average of all the values in the zY array. This is readily done
by simply averaging the column averages. Call the grand average b.
7. Compute the sum of squares of the differences between the grand average, ',




8. Compute the sum of squares of the differences between the normalized row
averages, Y,, and the individual normalized array values, z. using the equation:
mr-k
,A, I Z O - F
1=1
9. For each row, compute V , an estimate of the standard deviation:
10. Finally, compute each row (instance) scale value using the equation:
S, = b - f7, 76
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The final product of this outlined procedure are the scaled values of the
instances which are on the same interval scale as the category bounds b,. With
this scale established, a linear transformation may be performed using the general
formula:
y= a + fx, /? > 0
which will adjust the scale as desired. When performing the linear transformation
it is critical to adjust both the instance values and the category bounds. [Ref.
30: pp. 14-15]
The categorical APL programs combine several of these steps possibly
making the concept difficult to understand. Thus, an example will be presented
to ensure undcrstanding of the entire procedure and what the programs are do-
ing. Also, part of the requirements for using this technique is to develop an ap-
propriate survey to categorize instances, which has already been discussed.
2. Incomplete Arrays
The categorical method does have a flaw in that the computational pro-
cedurc should not be applied to an incomplete z,, array. Therefore in order to use
this method one must re-do the scaling problem in a way to obtain complete z.
arrays. Due to the fact the z, array corresponds to the cumulative relative fre-
qucncies, missing z, values are always found in one or more of the outermost
columns which involve the highest ranked categories, the lowest ranked catego-
ries, or both.
The approach used (as incomplete arrays occur within this study) was to
separate the zij array into smaller arrays and apply the previously discussed
method. The smaller grouped arrays are then scaled separately from the com-
plete z,, array. Hence, one must cleverly divide the original array in such a way
that the resulting set of scales have two or more points in common. The two or
65
more points in common will come from the upper category bounds so that ap-
propriate linear transformations will place all instances (human factors) and up-
per category bounds on the same scale. [Ref. 30: pp. 18-19]
If by chance the smaller array contains only the two higher order catego-
ries or the two lower order categories then one must take a different approach;
this will be referred to as the 'Special Transformation Case'. The scaled values
will be determined using the previously discussed method, however the linear
transformation method will differ slightly. In this case, since only one point or
upper category bound exists in common between any two arrays, a regression
technique must be applied to the scaled values. This regression technique uses
the established lower bound (0) from the original (or complete) z,, array and the
b (or grand average) of the smaller array as the scaled value to coincide with the
appropriate established upper bound (100). The regression pi-ocedure requires
three points to be used, therefore the slope of the line between the scaled values
and the bounds must be determined. Once the slope equation is determined then
any transformed value from the other scales may be used to determine the third
value. When the scaled values are regressed against the transformed values, then
all instances are placed on the same linear transformed scale.
3. Walk-Through of Interval Scale Construction
Before demonstrating the technique, it must be emphasized that the re-
sults for this demonstration will differ from the actual survey results. This dif-
ference is due to the fact that the final boundaries and interval scale determined
through this technique are rclatirc to the factors used in deriving the boundaries.
Since the intent of this walk-through is to illustrate the steps taken to determine
the scale, a reJuced number of factors are used. The actual results from the sur-
veys will be presented in the next section of the study.
Once the raw data is collected, a matrix is formed with the instances being
the rows and the categories being the columns. An individual cell will be referred
to as p,, with the i representing the row number and the j the column number.
For this example, ten of the actual human factors from the Initial Survey were
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selected to represent the instances. The collected raw frequencies have been ar-
ranged in the matrix to coincide with the appropriate instance and category. The
categories, as stated earlier, must be listed in ascending order with the least de-
sirable category in the leftmost column. Table 2 illustrates a sample matrix with
actual raw data taken from the first survey.
Table 2. INITIAL SURVEY RESULTS - ARMY TOTAL (SAMPLE)
Very Not IpratVeryHuman Factor Notortart
Unimportant Important Important
Jet Lag 7 48 43 3
Cowardliness 3 26 52 20
Fear 2 22 65 12
Honor 2 17 55 27
Intuition 0 14 51 36
Stress 0 2 64 35
Sleep Loss 0 3 49 49
Leadership 0 0 6 95
Morale 0 0 35 66
Training/Experience 0 0 19 82
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The relative frequencies will be computed by dividing each cell in a row
by the row total or the total number of respondents. For this example, a total
of 101 respondents were used resulting in the relative frequencies shown in Table
3.
Table 3. RELATIVE FREQUENCIES - ARMY TOTAL (SAMPLE)
Human Factor Very Not Important Very
Unimportant Important Important
Jet Lag 0.069 0.475 0.426 0.030
Cowardliness 0.030 0.257 0.515 0.198
Fear 0.020 0.218 0.644 0.118
Honor 0.020 0.168 0.545 0.26 7
Intuition 0 0.139 0.505 0.356
Stress 0 0.020 0.634 0.346
Slep Loss 0 0.030 0.485 0.485
Leadership 0 0 0.059 0.941
Morale 0 0 0.34 7 0.653
Training/Experience 0 0 0.188 0.812
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The cumulative frequency, referred to as the 'P' array, is shown in Table
4. These values are attained by summing across a row (from left to right). Since
the probability of all responses within a category must sum to 1, the Very Im-
portant category will always have a value of 1.
Table 4. CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES - ARMY TOTAL (SAMPLE)
Human Factor Very Not Very
Unimportant Important Important Imporant
Jet Lag 0.069 0.544 0.970 1
Cowardliness 0.030 0.287 0.802 1
Fcar 0.020 0.238 0.882 1
Honor 0.020 0.188 0.733 1
Intuition 0 0.139 0.644 1
Stress 0 0.020 0.654 1
Sleep Loss 0 0.030 0.515 1
Leadership 0 0 0.059 1
lorale 0 0 0.347 1
Trainin,/ JExperience 0 0 0.188 1
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Now that the P array has been formed, all cells that contain values of p,
> 0.98 and p,, < 0.02 must be removed. Once these cells are removed an in-
complete array exists due to the fact that not all the rows have the same number
of cells. As a result, the zij array must be separated. With the removal of the
appropriate z,, cells, three arrays now exist which will be respectively called Scales
1, 2 and 3.
* Scale I - treated as a three-category problem with the upper bounds
of Very Important, Not Important, and Important.
* Scale 2 - treated as a two-category problem with the upper bounds
of Not Important and Important.
* Scale 3 - treated as a single-category problem with the upper bound
of Important.
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Tables 5 and 6 illustrate Scales I and 2 using the common upper bounds
of Not Important and Important. Table 7 has only the Important upper bound
in common with either of the other two scales therefore it falls into the special
transformation case.
Table 5. REMOVE P0 > 0.98 AND P0j < 0.02 - SCALE 1 (SAM-
PLE)
Human Factor Verv NotUnimportant Important Important
Jct Lag 0.069 0.544 0.970
Cowardliness 0.030 0.287 0.802
Fear 0.020 0.238 0.882
Honor 0.020 0.188 0.733
Table 6. REMOVE P' > 0.98 AND Pj < 0.02 -
SCALE 2 (SAMPLE)
Not
Human Factor Important Important
Intuition 0.139 0.644
Stress 0.020 0.654
Sleep Loss 0.030 0.515
Table 7. REMOVE P, > 0.98 AND







Since the pu's represent the probability density from a Normal (0,I) dis-
tribution, the z values were obtained from a Normal distribution table. The z
values are recorded in new arrays with Tables 8, 9, and 10 representing the nor-
malized values.
Table 8. NORMALIZE - SCALE 1 (SAMPLE) 
_____
Human Factor Very NotImotnUnimportant Important m ran
Jet Lag -1.485 0.115 1.890
Cowardliness -1.883 -0.560 0.850
Fear -2.055 -0.710 1.185
Honor -2.055 -0.885 0.625
Table 9. NORMIALIZE - SCALE 2 (SAMPLE)
Human Factor NotimotnHuman ractor ImportantImrtn
Intuition -1.085 0.3 70
Srrcss -2.055 0.3 95
Sleep Loss -1.88 3 0.045







Next, column values are summed and divided by the numbers of rows or
instances to obtain a column average. The column average, denoted b, , is the
value of the upper bound of category j on the interval scale. The row values fol-
low the same procedure so that the row average, denoted F, is computed for each
instance. The row averages are summed and divided by the total number of rows
to obtain the "grand average", denoted as b. The numerical manipulation to at-
tain 5 is as depicted in Tables 11, 12, and 13.
Table 11. GRAND AVERAGE - SCALE 1 (SAMPLE)
Very Not Row RowHuman Factor Unimportant Important Important Total Average
Jet Lag -1.485 0.115 1.890 0.520 0.173
Cowardlincss -1.883 -0.560 0.850 -1.593 -0.531
-2.055 -0.710 1.185 -1.580 -0.527
lonor -2.055 -0.885 0.625 -2.315 -0.772
Column -7.478 -2.040 4.550
Totals Grand
Colhn -1.869 -0.510 1.138 Average: b =-1.242
A t vrage's: b,
Table 12. GRAND AVERAGE - SCALE 2 (SAMPLE)
Not Row RowI luman Factor Imporant Important Total Average
Intuition -1.085 0.370 -0.715 -0.358
Stress -2.055 0.395 -1.66 -0.830
Slccp Loss -1.883 0.045 -1.838 -0.919
Column -5.023 0.810
Totals _Grand
Column -1.674 0.270 Average: b m -1.404
A verages: b3
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Table 13. GRAND AVERAGE - SCALE 3 (SAMPLE)
Row RowHuman Factor Important Total Average
Leadership -1.560 -1.560 -1.56
Morale -0.400 -0.400 -0.400
Training[Experience -0.885 0.885 -0.885
Column -2.845
Totals Grand
Column Average: b -- 0.948
Averages: b
The column averages for all three scales (Table 14) represent the scaled
uppcr bounds of the categories. These scaled values will be used during the
transformation procedure.
Table 14. UPPER BOUNDS - COLUMN AVERAGES (SAMPLE)
Very Not
Unimportant Important Important
Scale ! -1.869 -0.5100 1.130
Scale 2 j NA -1.674 0.270
Scale 3 NA NA .0.948
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The sum of squares for the column differences are computed with the
following equation:
rnk
B Z -(b,-b) '.
j=1
Since this equation applies to scales with more than one column, the sum of the
squares for the column differences for Scales I and 2 are:
rn-k
B(Scale 1) = Z(bj- )2
j=1
= (-1.869 - (-1.242))2 + (-0.510 - (-1.242))2
+ (1.138 - (-1.242))2
= 6.593
rn-k
B(Scale 2) = (b - E)2
j=1I
S(-1.674 - (-1.404)) 2 + (0.270 - (-1.404))2
- 2.875
As seen in Tables 15 and 16 the sum of squares of the individual differ-
ences of Scales 1 and 2 are computed using the equation:
m-k
A, = E (zj- FY
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Table 15. SUM OF SQUARE DIFFERENCES - SCALE 1 (SAMPLE)
AU = (Zij - F)
Very Not A; = jA 0Human Factor Unimportant Important Important
Jet Lag 2.749 0.003 2.948 5.700
Cowardliness 1.828 0.001 1.907 3.736
Fear 2.335 0.033 2.931 5.299
Honor 1.646 0.013 1.952 3.6 11
Table 16. SUM OF SQUARE DIFFERENCES - SCALE 2 (SAM-
PLE)
Ail = (z.. - F)2
Hua atrNot Important Ai =f Y A ij
Htuman Factor Important
In tuition 0.529 0.530 1.059
sriess 1.500 1.500 3.000
Shvcp Loss 0.929 0.929 1.859
The estimate of the standard deviation /a + c for each row is computed
by using f]31'A, . The scaled values of the instances can now be computed using
the equation:
S,= b - 1 BA,.
Scale 3 has no B or A, value. The scaled value is computed using the equation:
The S, values are on the same interval scale as the category bounds b,. With these
results recorded in Tables 17, 18, and 19 any linear transformation may now be
performed to move or reposition the scale wniere needed.
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Table 17. SCALED VALUES - SCALE 1 (SAMPLE)
Human Factor b - ZN/B/A., S
Jet Lag .1.242 - (0.173 /6.593/5.700 ) -1.428
Cowardliness -1.242 - (-0.531 ./6.593/3.736 ) -0.537
Fear -1.242 - (0.527 .6.593/5.299 ) -0.654
Honor -1.242 - (-0.772 ./6.593/3.611 ) -0.199
Table 18. SCALED VALUES - SCALE 2 (SAMPLE)
Human Factor b - j/B-iA Si
Intuition -1.404 - (-0.357'!2.875/1.059) -0.815
Stress -1.404 - (-0.830/2.875/3.000) -0.592
Sleep Loss -1.404 - (-0. 9 l 9.' 2.8 7 5 /I. 8 59 ) -0.261
Table 19. SCALED VALUES - SCALE 3 (SAMPLE)
Human Factor b - , S i
Leadership -0.948 - (-1.560) 0.612
Morale -0.948 - (-0.400) -0.548
Training/Experience -0.948 - (-0.885) -0.063
A linear transformation will now be performed to move both instance
values and the category bounds to the same scale. For this example, an arbitrary
value of zero (0) was selected as the upper bound on category Very Unimportant
and a value of 100 as the upper value of category Important.
77
By using the linear transformation equation, y = a + fix , where P3 > 0,
the unknowns can be determined by solving simultaneous equations. Also, a de-
sired value can be assigned as the middle bound and a statistical program such
as Minitab can be used to determine the three unknowns. By establishing this
linear transformation equation and letting x represent the raw or scaled data and
y represent the transformed data, Tables 20 and 21 can be formed for the trans-
formed values. The simultaneous equations for Scale 1 are:
100= a + #(1.138)
0 = + fl( -1.869)
and transformed values are given in Table 20.
Table 20. TRANSFORMED DATA - SCALE 1
(SAMPLE)
Human Factor x Value y Value




Upper Bound 1.138 100
Middle Bound -0.510 45.300
Lower Bound -1.869 0
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The simultaneous equations for Scale 2 are:
100 = c + fl(0.270)
0 = ct + f( -1.670)
and transformed values are given in Table 21.
Table 21. TRANSFORMED DATA - SCALE 2
(SAMPLE)
Human Factor x Value y Value
Intuition -0.815 69.860
Strev -0.592 76.056
Slcq Loss -0.873 68.247
Upper Bound 0.270 100
Lo%%er Bound -1.670 45.300
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Values determined using the regression technique on the Special Trans-
formation Case are shown in Table 22. The third value (shown as the rescalcd
value below) was drawn from Scale 2.
Table 22. TRANSFORMED DATA - SCALE 3
(SAMPLE)
Human Factor x Value y Value
Leadership ~ 0.6 12 269.169
Morale -0.548 142.747
Trainin-, Experience -0.063 195.604
Upper Bound -0.948 100
Rescaked Value -1.150 76.056
Lo%%er Bound -1.869 0
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The transformed data along with the ranking of each of the human fac-
tors in the sample are shown in Table 23. From this table, one can see how the
categorical judgment technique obtains a numerical value and, as a result, a
ranking structure for each factor. Analysis of this data is reserved for discussion
in the Results section of the thesis. It should be noted here that the rankings and
transformed values of the factors used in this example are relative to the other
factors. Under most circumstances, addition or deletion of factors from the cal-
culations will change the transformed data values. Since the data values and
rankings results (as shown in the next section) for the Initial Survey were calcu-
lated using 27 human factors, the actual transformed values are different than
those shown in this walk-through example.
Table 23. RANKING SCALES 1-3 (SAMPLE)
Human Factor Transformed Ranking
Data











Finally, an interval scale can be constructed with the transformed values
of both the category upper bounds and the scaled values of the instances. The
interval scale for the procedural walk-through example is depicted in Figure 12.
The eloquence of this procedure results from the fact that both relative order and
relative spatial distribution between factors is produced. This allows the user not
only to identify which factors are important, but also the relative degree of how




IMPORTANT 14.7 -- iOAL
12.2 - SLEEP LOSS








14.7 - JET LAO
VERY
UNIMPORTANT
Figure 12. lnter'il Scale - Example
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H. REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Before proceeding to an analysis of the results of the experiment, a review of
the points addressed in this section is in order.
" As a method of determining the most important factors affecting a
commander's decision, surveys allow the researcher to make inferences about
a large number of people from data drawn from a relatively small sample
of that group.
* The categorical judgment technique provides the user the ability to quantify
judgments described within specific categories.
* By considering only endogenous factors, the scope of consideration is nar-
rowed to a more manageable quantity.
" The research design delineates two surveys. The Initial Survey was designed
to identify the most important of 27 human factors. The Follow-On Survey
was designed to determine whether context or scenario would vary the rela-
tive importance of the top seven factors.
Given the experimental design and techniques described in this section and re-
sponses to distributed surveys, the results along with the appropriate analysis are
presented in the following section.
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IV. RESULTS
The preceding section explained the techniques used to determine the rank
order and magnitude of survey responses within the context of categorical judg-
ments. Through the administration of the Initial and Follow-On Surveys and the
application of these numerical techniques, raw results were attained and trans-
formed to interval scales. These scales provide the foundation for determining the
factors perceived to be important to a commander in a decision-making environ-
mcnt. This section provides a summary of results, with a complete listing of both
raw and transformed results included in Appendix E.
A. SURVEY I
Since the officers queried for this survey represented all four Armed Services
(Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy), a side-by-side comparison is possible
based on the final rank order of the human factors. The rankings were performed
for the six respondent groups as listed below:
* Army Total - includes all Army respondents
* Combat Arms - includes Army respondents from any one of the combut arms
branches (Air Defense, Armor, Artillery, Aviation, Infantry)
* Non-Combat Arms - includes Army respondents from any one of the combat
support or combat service support branches (Adjutant General, Chemical,
Engineer, Finance, Medical Service, Military Intelligence, Quartermaster,
Ordnance, Signal)
* Air Force - includes all Air Force respondents
* Alarine Corps - includes all Marine Corps respondents
* Nary - includes all Navy respondents.
The final rank order positions obtained from the categorical judgment technique
are as detailed in Table 24.
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Table 24. SURVEY I RESULTS - INTERSERVICE RANK COMPARISON
Army
HUMAN FACTOR Non- Air Navy Marine
Total Combat Combat Force CorpsArms Arms
Leadership I 1 1 4 1 4
Training/Experience 2 2 3.5 7 7 7
Initiative 3 3 2 3 2 1
Discipline 4 4 3.5 6 3 2
Cohesion 5 6 5 1 4 5
Morale 6 5 7 5 6 6
iiill. Motivation 7 7 6 2 5 3
Energy 8 9 8 8 9 9
Mental Fatigue 9 8 9 13 11 10
Slccp Loss 10 10 10 15 16 14
Strcss 11 11 12 16 13 13
Surprise 12 13 13 10 14 I1
Intuition 13 12 14 9 8 8
Physical Fatigue 14 14 II II 10 12
Combat Expeience 15 15 17 12 15 15
ilonor 16 17 15 19 12 16
Comradeship 17 16 19 20 20 20
Emotion 18 19 18 14 17 17
Social Mlotivation 19 24 16 17 18 22
Cowardliness 20 21 20 21 21 21
Uncertainty 21 18 22 22 24 19
Cognitive Factor 22 22 21 18 19 23
Fear 23 20 24 24 23 18
Isolation 24 23 23 23 25 24
National Characteristics 25 25 25 26 22 25
Jet Lag 26 26 26 25 26 26
Confinement 27 27 27 27 27 27
86
There are two predominant points from an interservice perspective. First,
considering only the four service groups, relative rankings are fairly consistent for
al services. The greatest variation occurs with the factors of:
* Honor - range in ranking from 12 =* 19
* Sleep loss - range in ranking from 10 =, 16
• Fear - range in ranking from 18 => 24
In fact, the range most frequently varied between 5 and 6 positions. Range of the
factors includes the endpoints. For instance, the factor Confinement has a range
of I since all foui service groups ranked this factor as the 27th most important
factor. The range of rankings was distributed as follows:
Table 25. SURVEY I - RANGE OF RANKINGS
Range 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Numbcr of 1 4 2 3 I7 7 2 1Factors .. 72
The second important point is that the seven factors identified as most im-
portant by all of the services were the same, albeit the order in which they were









As previously mentioned, the interval scale was preferred because it depicts
both magnitude and relative rank order of the factors. Given scaled value results
for Survey I (Appendix E), an interval scale for each of the six respondent groups
is possible. However, since Survey II encompassed only Army respondents, in-
terval scales depicting the three Army respondent groups (Total, Combat Arms,
Non-Combat Arms) were selected for presentation. The scales for these groups
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Figure 15. Survey I Interval Scale (Army Non-Combat Arms)
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Comparison of Combat Arms and Non-Combat Arms scales provides several
key insights:
* None of the factors listed resulted in Very Unimportant scaled values.
" The bounded categories contained the same factors, albeit in a different se-
quence, with the following exceptions:
" Sleep Loss and Mental Fatigue - viewed as Very Important by Combat
Arms and as Important by Non-Combat Arms.
" National Characteristics - viewed as Important by Combat Arms and Not
Important by Non-Combat Arms.
• Leadership was, by far, the most important factor selected by both groups,
ranging 48.2 => 73.9 units higher than the second most important factor.
* Non-Combat Arms results within the Very Important category are charac-
terized by three distinctly separate groups of human factors while the Com-
bat Arms results for the same category are slightly less pronounced.
For the purpose of comparison with the results attained in the subsequent
surveys, the rank order of the factors determined from the Army Total group will
be used as a baseline. Again, this is primarily due to the fact that only Army of-
ficers attending advanced study programs at the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) were queried in the Follow-On Survey. Since all services generally agreed
on the top seven factors, the focus for the Follow-On Survey was on those factors.
The rank order of the top seven human factors as determined by the Army Total










Recall that this survey was designed in two basic versions - Infantry and
Field Artillery. Both versions have parallel design and ask respondents to apply
the factors given the same general scenario context. Survey subjects were divided
such that Infantry-branched officers completed the Infantry scenario, Artillery-
branched officers completed the Artillery scenario, with the remaining officers
randomly split to ensure equal branch representation to both scenarios.
The results from these surveys will be presented from two perspectives. First,
a comparison of the similarities found through examining intra-scenario results
(i.e., Infantry versus Non-Infantry) *s presented. Second, total results for both
surveys will be compared with the top seven factors identified in the Initial Sur-
vey. This comparison formulates conclusions as to whether the application of a
scenario varied the relative importance of the human factors.
I. Infantry Scenario
The questionnaire portion of this scenario was developed within a speci-
fied context. The cases for the Infantry scenario are outlined below.
Case Number I - The unit commander is required to quickly decide how to
modifv his intended plan to secure two sites. The modification is necessary due
to the fact that his Executive Officer, who was going to supervise the security
of one of the sites (with the commander at the other) was medically evacuated.
Cae Number 2 - One of the two platoons protecting the site where the
commander is located starts receiving heay ground fire. The commander r-ust
make the decision whether to deploy the reaction force in support of that
platoon.
Case Number 3 - Two large rockets land 3 kilometers upwind from the
commander's location. Since the unit is currently in a reduced Mission Oriented
Protective Posture (MOPP), the commander must decide whether or not to go
to full MOPP and accept a degradation in defensive preparations.
Case Number 4 - A sister unit's defensive position sustained a direct hit with a
non-persistent nerve agent resulting in an estimated 110-115 casualties. The
battalion commander has directed the company commander to send one of the
platoon's from his current position to the sister unit's position to re-establish the
defense and assess/evacuate casualties. The battalion commander has also told
the company commander that he is to personally remain with the current site
security mission.
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Since all respondents were Army officers, results have been groupel in the
following categories:
* Total - includes all survey respondents
* Infantry - includes all respondents whose basic branch is Infantry
* Non-Infantry - includes all respondents whose basic branch is other than
Infantry.
The groupings (InfantryiNon-Infantry) were used to determine if familiarity with
the subject branch made a significant difference in the order or magnitude of the
human factors. The Total respondents group was used for a side-by-side com-
parisun with L' - Artillery scc.nario counterpart in light of the top seven factors
identified in Survey I.
a. Interval Scales
The interval scaled results from the Infantry version are depicted in
Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19. These diagram each case of the scenario and are
presented in a manner that allows for comparison between Infantry and Non-
Infantry respondents.
For all of the interval scales developed for Survey II, the lower bound
of the highest category (Very Important) was always set at 100. Tne other bound
used ,vas set at zero (0), designating the upper bound of the Neutral,
Unimportant, or Very Unimportant category depending on the nature of the data.
The interval scales, as drawn, depict categorical bounds to the left of the scale
while scaled factors are presented to right of each scale. The numerical bounds
of the categories ae also on the left and are characterized by a number within a











Figure 16. Infantry Version - Case 1 (Infantry versus Non-Infantry)
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Figure 18. Infantry Version - Case 3 (Infantry versus Non-Infantry)
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Figure 19. Infantry Version - Case 4 (Infantry versus Non-Infantry)
96
b. Infantry versus Non-Infant#y Comparison
There are several points which can be derived by comparing the in-
terval scaled values for the four Infantry scenario cases.
* In a case-to-case comparison, none of the rankings were exactly the same
between the four cases.
* Leadership was ranked as the most important factor by both groups of re-
spondents in three of the four cases.
* In all cases, the factors of Cohesion and Morale tended toward the bottom
of the scale.
* With respect to Case 3, Discipline was viewed by Infantry respondents as the
most important factor, however Training.,Experience was the most impor-
tant factor as determined by Non-Infantry respondents. Additionally,
Cohesion was identified as the least significant factor for both respondent
groups, dropping into the Neutral category for Non-Infantry respondents.
* In Case 4, Leadership is prominently identified as the top factor while the
other six factors are grouped and appear much more compact when com-
pared to the other three cases.
Other than the differences delineated above, no other significant differences were
detected between Infantry and Non-Infantry respondents. As a result, it was de-
termined that the branch of the respondent had no significant impact with respect
to the results attained from the Infantry scenario.
2. Artillery Scenario
The Artillery version of the Follow-On Survey paralleled the design of its
Infantry counterpart. The four cases for the Artillery scenario are outlined below.
Case Number I - The unit commander is required to quickly decide which
platoon to deploy forward to support an element of the Task Force that is
guarding an Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). A decision is necessary since the
deployed platoon will have to act as an independent firing element. Both
platoon leaders are relatively new to their positions.
Case Number 2 - The platoon that is firing artillery support for the Task Force
element protecting the ASP starts receiving machinegun and indirect fire. The
commander must make the decisior; whether to displace the unit and tempo-
rarily stop artillery support or to continue the artillery support and fight off the
aggressors.
97
Case Number 3 - Two large rockets land 3 kilometers upwind from the
commander's location. Since the unit is currently in a reduced Mission Oriented
Protective Posture (MOPP), the commander must decide whether or not to go
to full MOPP and accept a degradation in providing artillery support.
Case Number 4 - A sister unit's defensive position sustained a direct hit with a
non-persistent nerve agent resulting in an estimated 60-75 casualties. The
commander has been directed to send a platoon to that position to defend and
assessevacuate casualties. Additionally, the deployed platoon is to ensure the
security of the nuclear rounds at that location. The decision must be made on
which platoon to send to this position in light of each platoon's current status.
Again, since all respondents were Army officers, results have been grouped in the
following categories:
* Total - includes all survey respondents
* Artillcry - includes all respondents whose basic branch is Artillery
" Non-Artillcry - includes all respondents whose basic branch is other than
Artillery.
The mutually exclusive sub-groupings (Artillery/Non-Artillery) were used to de-
termine if contextual familiarity made a significant difference in the ranking or
scaled values of the factors considered. The Total respondents group was used
for comparison with its Infantry counterpart.
a. Interval Scalcs
The interval scaled results from the Artillery version are depicted in
Figures 20, 21, 22, and 23. These diagrams show each case of the scenario and
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Figure 23. Artillery Version - Case 4 (Artillery versus Non-Artillery)
100
b. Artillery versus Non-Artilleiy Comparison
There are several points which can be derived by comparing the in-
terval scaled values for the four Artillery scenario cases.
The scaled values for some of the factors seen in these cases are higher than
those seen in previous scales. This increase in magnitude (i.e., scaled values
greater than 300) can be attributed to the relatively small sample sizes. This
phenomenon can be seen in both Cases 2 and 3 for Artillery respondents.
Artillery respondents ranked Leadership as the most important factor in
three of four cases. Non-Artillery respondents ranked Leadership as the
most important in two of four cases, while ranking it as a close second to
Discipline in Case 2.
W ith respect to Case 3, Training/Experience was viewed by the Artillery re-
spondents as the most important while Non-Artillery respondents considered
Training; Experience and Discipline of equal importance.
* There is no clear-cut pattern as experienced in Infantry Case 4. However,
the factors which were consistently at the bottom of the scale were Cohesion,
Morale, and Initiative.
* With respect to categorization, all factors were categorized as Important or
Very Important with the exception of two factors in Case 3:
a Cohesion - categorized by Non-Artillery respondents as Neutral
a Initiative - categorized by Artillery respondents on the boundary sepa-
rating Neutral and Unimportant.
Other than a variation in the order in which the factors were listed and the dif-
ferences delineated above, no other significant differences were detected between
Artillery and Non-Artillery respondents. As a result, it was determined that the
branch of the respondent had no significant impact with respect to the results
received in the Artillery version.
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C. COMPARISON OF RESULTS
This final section of the results is used to show the differences between the
survey results in light of the top seven factors identified in the Initial Survey.
Results were determined using Total respondents from Infantry and Artillery
survevs.
1. Interval Scales
The interval scales depicting the results from the four cases from Survey
II are depicted in Figures 24 through 27. Each case is portrayed in a manner
which allows for a side-by-side comparison between the versions of the survey.
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Figure 27. Survey 11 - Case 4 (Infantry Total versus Artillery Total)
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2. Initial Survey versus Follow-On Survey
The interval scales for Total respondents provide an adequate reference
from which to derive several conclusions concerning the rank and magnitude
variation when compared to the top seven human factors from Survey 1. First, if
the top seven factors from Survey I are grouped by scaled magnitude, there are
four distinct groups of factors. These groupings are as shown in Table 26.











In light of these groups of factors, how did the results from the Initial
Survey differ from those in the Follow-On Survey? The answer to this question
is captured in the following conclusive points:
* In all of the cases considered in Survey I, the order, magnitude, and
dispersion of the factors changed with respect to those received in Survey 1.
* Leadership remained as the predominant factor with the exception of Case
3. It can be concluded that given a commander has confidence in his equip-
ment, he may rely on the Training/Experience and Discipline of the individ-
ual soldiers within the command to react or respond rapidly to an alarm
rather than accept a degradation in mission posture. As such, the Cohesion
of the unit may weigh less on his decision since individual actions will de-
termine the fate of the unit.
" Training:Experience appear together in seven of eight cases, both weighing
extremely heavy in Case 3 which, again, was made in light of the
commander's reliance on individual soldier reaction. Overall, application of
the scenarios had no major impact on the ranking of these two factors.
Initiative, the third most important factor as determined through the
dimensionless context of Survey I, varied from 3.5 - 7 in Survey II. There-
fore, the relative importance of Initiative is heavily dependent on the context
of the scenario in which it is applied.
" Will. Motivation was the least significant factor (of the top seven) as deter-
mined in Survey I, however once applied to a specific context, it was found
to much more significant. This factor was generally ranked as 4 => 5 in level
of importance.
" Cohesion and Morale tended toward the lower rankings in all cases. The
fluctuation seen in these factors was primarily caused by the perceived in-
creased importance of Will/Motivation and the decreased importance of In-
itiative. In light of the other factors considered, the application of these
factors varied slightly from Survey I to Survey II.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Command and Control decisions impact on the effectiveness of tactical units.
Since a combat environment is characterized by an extreme chaotic nature, the
command and control system supporting the commander must be capable of al-
lowing for well-grounded decisions within this environment. In addition to the
multitude of other factors which a commander must consider during the
decision-making process, human dimensions and human factors inherent to the
unit are considered -- sometimes consciously, other times subconsciously.
In isolating those factors which might be important to a commander, 61 hu-
man factors were identified. Emphasis was placed on first order effects
throughout the study. This was necessary to avoid premature aggregation of the
factors under consideration in an effort to establish clcar causal/effect relation-
ships. The factors were categorized using a model developed by Vandivier which
allowed for discrete categorization. Once categorized, endogenous factors (those
factors which are inherent within the soldier) provided the primary research fo-
cus.
Two surveys were used to determine the factors which impact on a
commander's decision. The Initial Survey (Survey I) focussed on determining the
nk order and magnitude of the 27 endogenous factors under consideration. The
Follow-On Survey (Survey II) used the top seven factors identified in Survey I
as the basis for determining whether the context or scenario to which the factors
were applied would make a significant difference in relative importance. The
technique used for determining the results (i.e., categorical judgments) made no
assumption of the relationship of one factor to another, but placed each factor
on its estimated position on a common scale. This an-Iytical procedure, used
primarily for constructing the interval scales, was easily performed using the data
from the surveys.
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Based on the assumptions mode for Survey I using categorical j idgments
(normality, homogeneity of variance), the interv', scales obtained yielded perti-
nent information as to the relative order of importance of human factors. The
following list represents the Army Total respondents ranking of the top seven









Only relative rankings are obtained and no statements can be made about pro-
portionality of values (e.g., ratios between scales). However, comparisons in
magnitude can be made. For example, one can make the statement that, if it is
determined that Discipline is important to a commander in a decision-making
environment, then Leadership is much more important. No other statistical con-
clusions can be inferred.
Survey II assumptions paralleled those of the previous survey. Two versions
of this survey were designed (i.e., Infantry and Artillery), each containing four
sub-scenarios or cases. When compared to the order and relative magnitudes of
the top seven factors from Survey I, the following can be concluded from the re-
sults of Surxey II:
* In all cases, application of the factors within the coatext changed the order
and relative level of significance.
* Leadership was the predominant factor in three of four cases (for each ver-
sion). Only Case 3, where the commander's decision was seen to reiv more
on the individual actions of soldiers within the command, was leadership less
important than Discipline and Training/Experience.
* Initiative was seen with decreased importance once applied within a sce-
nario, while Will/Motivation assumed a much greater importance within the
context of a specified scenario.
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Further study may add to the robustness and increase the foundation estab-
lishcd within this research effort. Since this study represented a demonstration
of technique and was essentially a 'pilot' effort, results determined herein can be
substantiated by expanding the sampie population to include a wider variety of
Army commanders. Future experimental design to support these findings should
include:
" Varying the type of external enrironment in which the factors are to be ap-
plied. For instance, an experiment designed to apply factors within a jungle
environment may conclude differing results from those found within this
study.
* Along with the environment, the type or level of combat could be varied to
check for sensitivity in the ranking of the factors. This could be accom-
plished by presenting respondents with a Low Intensity conflict scenario as
opposed to the Mid to High Intensity scenario painted within Survey II.
" Finally, varying the level at which the factors are considered may produce
different results. Do the human factors that a Battalion Commander con-
siders differ from those considered by a Company Commander?
Returning to Dr Vandivier's human factors model points out one strong
consistency. Recall that the model discretely classified the factors under consid-
eration into four categories: endogenous/transitory, endogenous/enduring,
exogenous transitory, and exogenous; enduring. The common thread that ties that
model and the current study together lies in the factors identified as most impor-
tant through Survey I. The top seven factors (as determined by all four military
services) were classified as cndogcnous/cnduring factors. As such, it is highly re-
commended that future research focus primarily on factors within that category.
From a broader perspective, how can the results of this study be used? With
projected budget cuts and a shrinking force size within the Army, the human di-
mensions relative to the development of future systems will, most assuredly, re-
ceive much greater emphasis. The greatest contributions that research efforts
such as this one provide can be narrowed to two areas: modeling and
training/doctrine.
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If combat models are to represent a realistic combat environment, the entities
within that environment must be realistically modeled. Combat is a human ven-
ture; as such, humans contribute directly to the uncertainty and lack of predict-
ability experienced in battle. Combat modelers, therefore, must strive to integrate
the human dimension into the models. One of the pieces of the 'integration puz-
zle' has been addressed in this study - that is, which factors are considered im-
portant enough to be modeled. The question, left to the modeler, is how to model
human factors. To date, modelers are unsure whether the integration of human
factors into combat models will significantly change the outcome of simulated
battles. This question cannot be answered until after the factors are adequately
modeled.
An awareness of important human factors has potential for advances in the
training and doctrine arena. If there is a specified number of factors that current
commanders consider important in their decisions, the focus of the institutional
base should be to emphasize those factors not only in a school environment, but
also in the doctrine which guides commanders in the field. With respect to train-
ing, some of the artificialities which are necessary due to peacetime constraints
undoubtedly have an effect on how commanders are trained to formulate deci-
sions. Most importantly, the absence of the threat of personal injury (or death)
as a result of enemy actions creates a wide, but relatively unknown effect on the
methodology a commander uses to derive C1 decisions. It is difficult, at best, to
create many of the emotional consequences which have been experienced in past
conflicts.
Overcoming obstacles such as the inherent qualitative nature or the
intangibility of human factors is by no means an easy task. It does, however
present a challenge to the ambitious and imaginative -- that challenge is to in-
crease the comprehension of man's understanding of man.
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APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS




APL A Programming Language
ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASP Ammunition Supply Point
C0 Command and Control
CINC Commander-in-Chief
IIQ Headquarters
MANPRINT Manpower and Personnel Integration
MILES Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement
System
MOE Measure of Effectiveness
/IOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MORIMOC More Operational Realism in the Modeling
of Combat
MORS Military Operations Research Society
NCO Noncommissioned Officer
NPS Naval Postgraduate School
NTC National Training Center
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
XO Executive Officer
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APPENDIX B. HUMAN FACTORS DEFINITIONS
Listed below is a comprehensive list of the human factors considered in the
dc~iopment of this study. Definitions not specifically referenced represent the
author's interpretation of the factor for the purposes of this study.
* ALTITUDE - How far above sea level the battlefield is. (Reduced oxygen
at high altitudes is likely to impair physical and cognitive performance) [Ref.
25: p. A-2].
* A TTITUDE - Any habitual mode of regarding anything; a settled behavior
or conduct; an indicating opinion or purpose regarding anything [Ref. 24:
p. 184].
" BOREDOM - The condition of being bored; a person or thing that wearies
one through lack of interest [Ref. 24: p. 312].
" COGNITIVE FACTOR - Various mental abilities which can be measured
on standardized tests such as the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
(ASVB) [Ref. 25: p. A-1]. (Can be referred to as intellect).
" COHESION - A feeling of group unity which entails common interests,
goals, and responsibilities [Ref. 25: p. A-2].
" COMRADESHIP - Fear of failure in front of comrades.
* CONFINEAENT - Restricted within limits or boundaries; feeling of being
physically enclosed or confined in a definitive space.
* COORDINATION- Gross (large muscle) and fine (visual-motor) coordi-
nation [Ref. 25: p. A-I].
* COIVARDLINESS - One who shrinks from one's duty; one who lacks
courage [Ref. 24: p. 601]. Withdrawing from one's duty; lacking courage.
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0 CROVDING - The closeness or the closing in of battle around a unit.
* CULTURE - The training, development, or strengthening of the powers,
mental or physical, or the condition thus produced; improvement or refine-
ment of mind, morals, or tastes [Ref. 24: p. 629].
, DARK NESS - Lack of light.
o DECISION-MAKING - The ability of someone in charge to make sound,
logical decisions in view of available information [Ref. 25: p. A-1].
0 DEDICA TION - To devote or give up, as oneself, to some special purpose;
to direct attention or energy toward; as, to dedicate oneself to a cause [Ref.
24: p. 667].
9 DEPRESSION - A falling of the spirits; dejection (ref.2 p.684). [Ref. 24:
p. 684].
* DISCIPLINE - Systematic training or subjection to authority [Ref. 24: p.
721].
* DRJVE - To carry forward or prosecute with urgency [Ref. 24: p. 762].
o EDUCA TION LEVEL - The amount of education that one possesses.
9 EMOTION- An act or state of excited feeling [Ref. 24: p. 813]. The power
or state of feeling.
0 ENDURANCE - The capacity or power to endure; ability to suffer pain,
distress, hardship, or any very prolonged stress without succumbing [Ref.
24: p. 820].
* ENERGY - The capacity to keep going around the clock (can be referred to
as Drive).
• ESPRIT dc CORPS - A spirit of common devotedness, sympathy, or sup-
port among the members of an association or a body [Ref. 24: p. 852].
e EXCITEMENT - Stimulation [Ref. 24: p. 870].
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* EXPERIENCE - The amount of time in combat scldiers have actually
worked on a daily basis in a particular specialty [Ref. 25: p. A-I].
9 FEAR - To regard with fright or terror; to be afraid [Ref. 24: p. 903].
* FIRE - The evolution of heat [Ref. 24: p. 926].
0 FRUSTRATION - The act of frustrating; bafflement; disappointment; de-
feat [Ref. 24: p. 988].
* HONOR - Fear of failure of country, traditions and family.
* IDEOLOGY - Fanciful speculation; the forming of impracticable theories
[Ref. 24: p. 1221].
* IN!ITIATIVE - An introductory step or action; a first move [Ref. 24: p.
1264]. The capacity to get things going; make a first move.
* INTUITION - The quick perception of truth without conscious attention or
reasoning (sometimes called "gut feeling").
0 ISOLATION - The actual or perceived (related to the confusion or fog of
war) separation from the group/unit.
* JET LAG - Temporary disruption of the normal biological rhythms follow-
ing long distance airplane travel across several time zones. Closely related
to the circadian rhythmic cycle [Ref. 25: p. A-2].
* LEADERSHIP - Ability to lead so as to exact maximum effort toward
achieving objectives on the battlefield [Ref. 25: p. A-2].
* MENTAL FA TIGUE - Extreme tiredness which results from prolonged ex-
ercise of mental processes [Ref. 25: p. A-l]. Tiredness which results from
extended mental exertion with the effect of reduced quantity/quality of de-
cision.
* MOMENTUM - The power of overcoming resistance possessed by a body
by reason of its motion [Ref. 24: p. 1598].
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* MORALE - Mental condition in a group which consists of cheerfulness and
confidence [Ref. 25: p. A-1]. The state of mind with reference to confidence,
courage, and zeal.
" NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS - Differences between soldiers of Ar-
mies of different countries which might affect performance [Ref. 25: p. A-2].
* NA TIONAL ETHOS - The spirit of the people of a nation.
• NOISE - The loudness of battle.
" OBEDIENCE - Submission to or compliance with a command [Ref. 24: p.
1701].
* PHYSICAL APTITUDE - The level of coordination of a person.
" PHYSICAL CONDITIONING - The act of being physically fit; capable of
enduring.
" PHYSICAL FATIGUE - Extreme tiredness which results from prolonged
and'or considerable physical exertion during combat [Ref. 25: p. A-i].
" PRLML4R Y GROUP - Small group of comrades that a soldier fights with
[Rcf. 32: p. 3211; generally three to four other soldiers.
* PROPAGANDA - Efforts directed systematically toward the gaining of
support for an opinion or course of action [Ref. 24: p. 1985].
* SLEEP LOSS - Loss of sleep over a specified period of time. Often quanti-
fied as the number of hours sleep sustained for a specified time period.
Closely related to the circadian rhythm cycle, which varies soldier alertness
as a function of the time of day [Ref. 25: p. A-i].
* SOCIAL MOTIVATION - Feeling that your are fighting for a just cause
(some relate this to patriotism).
" SOLDIER LOAD. The weight foot soldiers are required to carry on or eli
route to the battlefield [Ref. 25: p. A-I].
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* STRENGTH - The quality or property of being physically strong; power
[Ref. 24: p. 2396].
9 STRESS - Extreme anxiety that results from the intensity of action, fear of
injury or loss of life during combat [Ref. 25: p. A-i].
• SUPPRESSION - Pinning down or immobilization on the battlefield and
the reduced return of fire or mobility which is likely to result from it.
• SURPRISE - To shock or astonish by some unexpected act or event [Ref.
24: p. 2430]. The suddenness of the enemy or enemy fire.
* TERRAIN - A physical description of the major geophysical features of the
battlefield. Examples include flat, hilly, forest, mountainous, desert, or ur-
ban areas [Ref. 25: p. A-i].
* TOXICITY - The presence of nuclear, biological or chemical agents on the
battlefield. This dimension often refers to degradation in performance which
results when soldiers wear MOPP gear [Ref. 25: p. A-2].
* TRAINING/EXPERIENCE LEVEL - Resident and unit training. (Training
decay is included under this dimension because it results from inadequate
refresher training or opportunity to practice the tasks in question) [Ref. 25:
p. A-2]. (May include levels -- High, medium, or low unit level training)
Individual and unit training as related to the level of expertise achieved.
* UNCERTAINTY - Unsureness of what is about to happen. The state of
doubt or unsureness of future events or actions.
o VALUES- What one believes in. (Could also be looked at as moral values).
o VISIBILITY - The ability to see what is happening on the battlefield. Visi-
bility might be hampered by nightfall, fog, weather conditions, or smoke
[Ref. 25: p. A-2].
0 WEA THER - Variations in temperature and humidity (including fog, rain,
snow, and other inclement conditions) which affect the soldier's ability to
fight [Ref. 25: p. A-I].
o VILL/MO TIVA TION - Willingness to do whatever is necessary to fight
and win [Ref. 25: p. A-1].
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The Initial survey was designed to determine the most important factors
affecting a commander's decision. As such, it had two major objectives:
1. To isolate those factors which respondents perceived would impact on a
reduced-time command and control decision.
2. To determine whether there was any difference in how respondents from
different services perceived the most important factors.
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This questionnaire is part of a study to determine to what
degree various human fa .Iors impact on operational command and control
(C2) decisions. The objective of this questionnaire is to obtain an estimate
of the impact of human factors which are considered by a tactical-level
commander in making reduced-time, operatio;ial command and control
decisions. We believe that the best way to understaed which factors a
commander would consider important is to ask military officers who have
held leadershp positions with varying degrees of responsibility.
The questionnaire will not just be used as a subject for a thesis
and later disregarded. In fact, the results from this survey will provide
the basic framework for advancements in the development of quantified,
cause/effect audit trails between specific human factors and combat
outcomes. Your honest opinion and perceptions of how these fa-' rs will
affect a commander's decision is critical to the appropriate weighting of
the factors. Specific instructions on completing the questionnaire can be
found on the next page. It will probably take 10-15 minutes to
complete the questionnaire.
Note that there are 3 parts to the survey. Part I consists of
basic demographic information. Part II asks to what level of importance
the specified human factors would impact on a commander's decision.
Part III consists of an open statement that allows you to input any human
factors that you consider important but which were not considered ir, the
main part of the survey. The questionnaires are completely confidential.
The individual identity of respondents will not be recorded. Please return
the questionnaire in the enclosed envelope by Friday, 23 February
1990.
Thank you very much for your help and valuable time.
121n U.S. lkrm 0
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Part I - DEMOGRAPHICS
SERVICE (circle one): Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps
CURRENT 3RADE (circle one): 0-1 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6
BRANCH/SPECIALTY:
TIME ON ACTIVE DUTY: - years _ months
TIME SPENT IN COMMAND/DEPARTMENT HEAD: years months
TIME SPENT AS A STAFF OFFICER: _ years _ months
COMBAT VETERAN (circle one): YES NO
IF YES, WHERE: _ HOW LONG:
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
The questionnaire is self-explanatory. If there is any difficulty
in interpreting the questions, try to give the most reasonable answer
possible.
On the following pages are 27 human factors for your
consideration. In general, you should approach this survey as a
tactical-level commander whose force is actively engaged with an enemy
force. The scenario and context have been purposely left open-ended and
provide a *dimensionless' environment allowing you to apply the listed
factors in accordance with your personal experiences. With this in mind,
your response should reflect the relative importance of each human
factor in light of a reduced-time, operational C2 decision.
Your answers are extremely important in insuring that the
appropriate and most significant factors are identified. Again, we are
interested ;n knowing, based on your past experiences, to what extent
each human factor impacts on the commanders thought process.
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PART II - QUESTIONNAIRE
Of the Human Factors listed below, some are inherent in the individual
service member, some apply only to the level possessed by a unit, while
others can apply to both the individual and unit.
How Important is each of these HUMAN FACTORS (as possessed
by the unit or individuals within the unit) to a commander in his
formulation of a reduced-time, operational command and
control decision?
VERY NOT VERY
IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT UNIMPORTANT
COGNITIVE FACTOR
Various mental abilities which can
be measured on standardized test
such as the Arm Services ( ) () () ( )
Vocational Aptitude (ASVB).
(can be referred to as Intellect)
COHESION
The feeling of group unity which
entails common interests, goals, ( ) ( ) ( )
and responsibilities.
COMBAT EXPERIENCE
The amount of time in combat ( ) ( ) ( ) (
soldiers have actually experienced.
COMRADESHIP
The fear of failure in front of comrades. ( ) ( ) C )
CONFINEMENT
Restricted within limits or boundaries;
the feeling of being physically enclosed
or confined in a definitive space. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
COWARDLINESS
withdrawing from onm's duty: ( ) ( ) () ()
lacking courage.
DISCIPLINE
The systematic training or ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
subjection to authority.
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PART I I (continued)
Of the Human Factors listed below, some are inherent in the individual
service member, some apply only to the level possessed by a unit, while
others can apply to both the individual and unit.
How Important is each of these HUMAN FACTORS (as possessed
by the unit or individuals within the unit) to a commander In his
formulation of a reduced-time, operational command and
control decision?
VERY NOT VERY
IMPORTrANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT UNIMPORTANT
EMOTION
The power or state of feeling.()()()()
ENERGY
The capacity to keep going
around the clock.()()()()
(can be referred to as Drive)
FEAR
To regard with fright or terror;()()(
to be afraid.
HONOR
The fear of failure of country,()()(
traditions, and family.
INITIATIVE
The capacity to gel things going;( ()()()
make a first move.
INTUITION
The quick perception of truth without
conscious attention or reasoning.( ()(
(sometimes called a Out Feeding')
ISOLATION
The actual or perceived separation )(()(
from the one's group/unht.
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PART II (continued)
Of the Human Factors listed below, some are inherent in the individual
service member, some apply only to the level possessed by a unit, while
others can apply to both the individual and unit.
How important is each of these HUMAN FACTORS (as possessed
by the unit or individuals within the unit) to a commander in his
formulation of a reduced-time, operational command and
control decision?
VERY NOT VERY
IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT UNIMPORTANT
JET LAG
The temporary disruption of the
normal biological rhythms following
long distance airplane travel across ( ) ( ) ( )
several time zones.
LEADERSHIP
The ability to lead so as to exact
maximum effort toward achieving ( ) ( ) ( )
objectives on the battlefield.
MENTAL FATIGUE
The extreme tiredness which results
from prolonged exercise of mental
processes. Tiredness which results ( ) ( ) ( )
from extended mental exertion.
MORALE
The state of mind with reference ( ) ( ) ( )
to confidence, courage, and zeal.
NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The differences between soldiers of
Armies from different countries ( ) C ) C ) ( )
which might affect performance.
PHYSICAL FATIGUE
The extreme tiredness which results
from prolonged and/or considerable C ) C C )
physical exertion during combat.
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PART II (continued)
Of the Human Factors listed below, some are inherent in the individual
service member, some apply only to the level possessed by a unit, while
others can apply to both the individual and unit.
How Important is each of these HUMAN FACTORS (as possessed
by the unit or individuals within the unit) to a commander in his
formulation of a reduced-time, operational command and
control decision?
VERY NOT VERY
IMPORTANT IMPORTANT IMPORTANT UNIM=ORTANT
SLEEP LOSS
The loss of sleep over a specified ( ) ( ) ( ) (
period of time.
SOCIAL MOTIVATION
The feeling that you are fighting ( ) ( ) (
for a just cause.
STRESS
Extreme anxiety that results from
the intensity of action, fear of injury ( ) ( ) ( )
or loss of life during combat.
SURPRISE
To shock or astonish by some
unexpected act or event; the
suddenness of the enemy or ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
enemy fire.
TRAINING/EXPERIENCE LEVEL
Individual and unit training as related ( ) ( ) ( )
to the level of expertise achieved.
UNCERTAINTY
The stale of doubt or unsureness () () C ) ()
of future events or actions.
WILL/MOTIVATION
The willingness to do whateverls ( ) () ( ) 
necessary to fight and win.
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Part III - OPEN STATEMENT
Please add any other human factors that we may not have listed which a
commander should consider when making a reduced-time operational C2




The Follow-On Survey was designed to determine whether the relative
significance of the top seven factors identified from the Initial Survey varied when
applied within a specified context. As such, the primary objective was to deter-
mine whether respondents felt that the factors had the same (or differing) relative
importance based on four prescribed scenarios. There were two versions of the
survey, one Infantry-based and the other Artillery-based. The versions have a









Figure 29. Follow-On Survey Design
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2. Sample Survey
Both versions of the sample surveys are included here to illustrate the
point of parallel design. Each of the sub-cases establishes similar parameters for




This questionnaire is part of a study to determine to what
degree various human factors impact on command and control (C2 )
decisions. The objective of this questionnaire is to obtain an estimate of
the impact of human factors which are considered by a tactical-level
commander in making reduced-time, command and control decisions. We
believe that the best way to understand which factors a commander would
consider important is to ask military officers who have commanded.
The questionnaire will not just be used as a subject for a thesis
and later disregarded. In fact, the results from this survey will provide
the basic framework for advancements in the development of quantified,
cause/effect audit trails between specific human factors and combat
outcomes. Your honest opinion and perceptions of how these factors will
affect a commander's decision is critical to the appropriate weighting of
the factors. Specific instructions on completing the questionnaire can be
found on the next page. It will probably take 20-25 minutes to
complete the questionnaire.
There are four basic parts to the survey:
1. Part I - Survey Background Information
2. Part II - Battalion Task Force Scenario
3. Part Ill - Company Situation/Sub-cases
4. Part IV - Special Information
The questionnaire is self-explanatory. If there is any difficulty
in interpreting the questions, try to give the most reasonable answer
possible. Your answers are extremely important in ensuring that the
appropriate and most significant factors are identified. Again, we are
interested in knowing, to what extent each of the human factors presented
impacts on the commander's thought process. The questionnaires are
completely confidential. The individual identity of the respondents will
not be recorded. Please return the questionnaire in the enclosed envelope
by Friday, 4 MAY 1990.
Thank you very much for your help and valuable time.
Captain, U.S. Armg
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Part I - BRCKGROUND
;: For the purposes of this survey, perceived truth is considered to be
ground truth. In other words, this is not an exercise in how well your
intelligence system is working for you. Assume that what you are told is
exactly how it exists.
i0' The scenario is written to cover the basic information that you should
know as the commander of this unit. You will be time-stepped through a
series of different sub-scenarios or sub-cases. In each sub-case, apply
the human factors listed with regards to the weight that they
would play on your decision.
L Given the rate of political change within Europe, current trends-in
force reduction lead one to believe that a conflict is much less likely than
three years ago. For the purposes of this survey, assume that (for
whatever reasons) tensions have increased to the point that hostilities
between NATO and the remains of the Warsaw Pact are imminent.
0 Also, we realize that applying a list of human factors is not something
that you would normally conciously dwell upon, especially when reduced-
time decisions are critical. Most of the time these factors are part of a
subconcious consideration. We ask that you consider each factor
individually and try to avoid aggregation of factors.
0 Finally, we would ask you not to change a response once it has been
made.
0 The scenario for this survey is set in West Germany. Your Brigade
has been given the mission to defend a sector to the rear of a
defending front line division.
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HUMRN FRCTORS DEFINITIONS
The following definitions provide the author's intended meaning of the
human factors to be applied within this survey. Please refer to these
definitions as you complete the survey.
COHESION A feeling of group unity which entails common interests,
goals, and responsibilities.
DISCIPLINE Systematic training or subjection to authority.
INITIATIVE - An introductory step or action; a first move.
LEADERSHIP - Ability to lead so as to exact maximum effort toward
achieving objectives on the battlefield.
MORALE - Mental condition in a group which consists of cheerfulness
and confidence.
TRAININGI EXPERIENCE - Individual and unit training as related to the
level of expertise achieved.
WILLI MOTIVATION - Willingness to do whatever is necessary to fight
and win.
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Part II - TASK FORCE SCENARIO
*Task Force MECH, a mechanized infantry battalion task force, has been
given the mission to secure the Brigade Rear Area against possible
attacks by both conventional and unconventional forces. You are the
Company Commander of Company A, 1-92 (Mech) Infantry.
C0> The enemy main body is not expected to cross the Inter-German border
for 48 hours, however intelligence indicates that unconventional force
raids consisting of 5-30 men can occur at any time. Given the enemy's
current capability, indications are that he will target key logistical and
C2 facilities through repeated attacks well in advance of his main effort.
0 In a conventional attack, it is anticipated that the enemy will employ
chemical agents and, as a result the Task Force Commander has ordered
the extended wear of MOPP suits, although boots, gloves and masks are to
be carried until needed.
* The Task Force Commander currently anticipates having to protect the
designated key assets with 360 degree security, including protection
against possible airborne insertions. He expects to have to fight the rear
area battle for the next 36-48 hours. The Task Force has been given a
contingency mission to be prepared to move into blocking positions in the
event of enemy penetration of forward defenses.
C:> The enemy can establish local air superiority for limited periods.
* Terrain - rolling hills with densely forested areas. Urban spread and
areas of 500 - 2,000 generally separated by 3-5 kilometers. Open areas
are mostly agricultural lands occupied by cattle farmers.
C Weather - clear days and cool nights; temperatures range from 42 - 73
degrees (F). Fog in low lying areas in early morning hours. No precipitation
expected over the next 72 hours.
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Part III - COMPANY SITUATION
C: You are the Alpha Company Commander which currently consists of:
1 st Platoon, A/ -92 Infantry (organic)
2nd Platoon, Atl-92 Infantry (organic)
3rd Platoon, A/1-92 Infantry (organic)
Mortar Platoon, A/1-92 Infantry (organic)
2 Anti-Armor Sections, E/1-92 Infantry (attached)
L> You have been in command of this company for the past 13 months.
I* Your company CP location is approximately 65 kilometers from the
Inter-German Border (IGB).
C You are in a defensive posture. Your primary mission is to protect an
ammunition supply point (ASP) and to provide perimeter security for the
Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC). As a contingency mission, you have
been told to be prepared to occupy a Battle positions well forward in the
event that the Red Hoard should breakthrough forward defenses.
I Although you have not specifically trained for the rear area miissions,
you realize that the small unit actions required in this environment S;t
similar to those experienced in other missions for which you consider
your company fully trained.
IC You have what you consider to be a well-trained chain of command
which you believe adapts wel to changing situations.
I Equipment is 100% operational; personnel strength is 100%.
I' Do not consider the success or failure of the Non-Combatant
Evacuation (NEO) plan in the ranking of the human factors listed.
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Case Number I
Your situation remains as indicated above.
You have decided to protect the Rear Area Operations Center with 2
platoons and the ASP with 1 platoon.
f Your Executive Officer (XO), who by your initial plan was going to
ensure the security of the ASP, has fallen, broken his leg, and required
MEDEVAC.
I YOL still have time to modify your plan, Although, you have faith in the
abilities of all of your platoons, you know the importance of ensuring that
the one that secures the ASP perimeter can operate independently.
You must decide which platoon to assign to the ASP security mission.
How important Is each of the human factors listed below (as
possessed by the unit or individuals within the unit) to you, as the
commander, in the formulation of this reduced-time decision?
Very Very
Iro Imorlan Neutral Unimnortant Unimprant
COHESION ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
DISCIPLINE () () () () ()
INITIATIVE () () () () ()
LEADERSHIP () () () () ()
MORALE ( ) () () ()
TRAININGI
EXPERIENCE () () () () ()
WILLI
MOTIVATION () () () () ()
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Case Number 2
You chose the 1st platoon for the ASP mission. The 1st platoon leader
reports that he has established limited security around the ASP.
Meanwhile, political tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact have
peaked and negotiations appear to be breaking down. At this point, your
intel assets indicate a conventional attack will occur within the next 24
hours.
You have positioned your Company CP inside the perimeter established
by your 2nd and 3rd platoons which is protecting the RAOC. Your only
reserve consists of 2 scout sections (personnel/equipment/vehicles)
which are currently under your operational control. Since you arrived in
position just 5 hours ago, your defensive positions are only semi-
prepared.
I Your 2nd platoon starts receiving both machinegun and indirect fire. You
are not sure whether or not this is a main attack by an enemy force or a
diversionary attack. Your decision is whether you should deploy the
immediate reaction force (at this point) to assist the 2nd platoon.
f How Important Is each of the human factors listed below (as
possessed by the unit or individuals within the unit) to you, as the
commander, In the formulation of this reduced-time decision?
Very Very
Important Impor1ant Neutral Unimnutant Unimptrtanl
COHESION () () () () ()
DISCIPLINE () () () () ()
INITIATIVE () () () () ()
LEADERSHIP () () () () ()
MORALE () () () () ()
TRAINING!
EXPERIENCE () () () () ()
WILLI
MOTIVATION () () () () ()
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Case Number a
You controlled the situation by deploying the reaction force who
engaged 10 ground warriors in civilian clothes carrying satchels of high
explosives and armed with light machineguns, light antitank weapons, and
man-poitable mortars.
I Reports coming from the forward defense units is that they are
receiving intense, concentrated artillery fire. This is prep fire for the
Pact's first echelon forces as they have started their rapid advance
toward the border.
I You receive a report that 2 large rockets have landed 3 kilometers
upwind of the RAOC. If this is a chemical round, you're not really sure that
the vapor cloud would reach your position. You realize that if you go to full
MOPP now, a degradation in performance occurs which will increase the
remaining 4 hours of defensive preparation to 10 hours. You are fully
confident in the chemical detection devices that you have emplaced on
your perimeter.
I You must now decide whether to go to full MOPP and accept the
degradation in performance.
t How Important Is each of the human factors listed below (as
possessed by the unit or individuals within the unit) to you, as the
commander, in the formulation of this reduced-time decision?
Very Very
mInortani Irmrtant Neuiral UnImoortant Unimomrtan
COHESION () () () () ()
DISCIPLINE () () () () ()
INITIATIVE () () () () ()
LEADERSHIP () () () () ()
MORALE () () () () ()
TRAININGI
EXPERIENCE () () () () ()
WIL L/
MOTIVATION () () () () ()
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Case Number g
You made the choice not to go into full MOPP.
In the interim, the Pact is making an all out attempt to penetrate
NATO's forward defenses. Your scout sections have been pulled back to
battalion; your commanders emphasis has shifted from the rear area
mission to integrating the battalion into the depth of the defense.
I One of your sister unit's defensive positions has just sustained a direct
hit by a non-persistent nerve agent. As a result, you have been ordered to
re-distribute your forces by moving one platoon into that position to
"defend and assessevacuate casualties." Early reports are that the
company has sustained 110 -115 KIA's. Your battalion commander has
ordered you (personally) to remain with the RAOC mission.
You must decide which platoon to send to handle the position
defense/casualty assessment mission.
I How important is each of the human factors listed below (as
possessed by the unit or individuals within the unit) to you, as the
commander, in the formulation of this reduced-time decision?
Very Very
Imnortant Important Neutral Unimporant Unimporan
COHESION ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
DISCIPLINE () () () () ()
INITIATIVE ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
LEADERSHIP () () () () ()
MORALE () () () () C)
TRAININGI
EXPERIENCE () () () C) ()
WILLI
MOTIVATION () () () () ()
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Part IV - SPECIAL INFORMATION
CURRENT GRADE (circle one): 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5
BRANCH/SPECIALTY:
TIME ON ACTIVE DUTY: _ years _ months
TIME SPENT IN COMMAND: - years _ months
TIME SPENT AS A STAFF OFFICER: years _ months
COMBAT VETERAN (circle one): YES NO
IF YES, WHERE: HOW LONG:
SURVEY EFFECTIVIENESS
1. Were the situations presented understandable?
(Yes or No - circle one) If not, why not?
2. Would you say that the situations presented were realistic?
(Yes or No - circle one) If not, why not?





This questionnaire is part of a study to determine to what
degree various human factors impact on command and control (C2)
decisions. The objective of this questionnaire is to obtain an estimate of
the impact of human factors which are considered by a tactical-level
commander in making reduced-time, command and control decisions. We
believe that the best way to understand which factors a commander would
consider important is to ask military officers who have commanded.
The questionnaire will not just be used as a subject for a thesis
and later disregarded. In fact, the results from this survey will provide
the basic framework for advancements in the development of quantified,
cause/effect audit trails between specific human factors and combat
outcomes. Your honest opinion and perceptions of how these factors will
affect a commander's decision is critical to the appropriate weighting of
the factors. Specific instructions on completing the questionnaire can be
found on the next page. it will probably take 20-25 minutes to
complete the questionnaire.
There are four basic parts to the survey:
1. Part I - Survey Background Information
2. Part II - Battalion Task Force Scenario
3. Part III - Battery Situation/Sub-cases
4. Part IV - Special Information
The questionnaire is self-explanatory. If there is any difficulty
in interpreting the questions, try to give the most reasonable answer
possible. Your answers are extremely important in ensuring that the
appropriate and most significant factors are identified. Again, we are
interested in knowing to what extent each of the human factors presented
impacts on the commanders thought process. The questionnaires are
completely confidential. The individual identity of the respondents will
not be recorded. Please return the questionnaire in the enclosed envelope
by Friday, 4 MAY 1990.
Thank you very much for your help and valuable time.
James S. Co e
Captain, U m
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Part I - BACKGROUND
For the purposes of this survey, perceived truth is considered to be
ground truth. In other words, this is not an exercise in how well your
intelligence system is working for you. Assume that what you are told is
exactly how it exists.
0 The scenario is written to cover the basic information that you should
know as the commander of this unit. You will be time-stepped through a
series of different sub-scenarios or sub-cases. In each sub-case, apply
the human factors listed with regards to the weight that they
would play on your decision.
0 Given the rate of political change within Europe, current trends in
force reduction lead one to believe that a conflict is much less likely than
three years ago. For the purposes of this survey, assume that (for
whatever reasons) tensions have increased to the point that hostilities
between NATO and the remains of the Warsaw Pact are imminent.
0 Also, we realize that applying a list of human factors is not something
that you would normally conciously dwell upon, especially when reduced-
time decisions are critical. Most of the time these factors are part of a
subconcious consideration . We ask that you consider each factor
individually and try to avoid aggregation of factors.
I' Finally, we would ask you not to change a response once it has been
made.
Q The scenario for this survey is set in West Germany. Your Brigade
has been given the mission to defend a sector to the rear of a
defending front line division.
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HUMAN FfACTORS DEFINITIONS
The following definitions provide the author's intended meaning of the
human factors to be applied within this survey. Please refer to these
definitions as you complete the survey.
COHESION - A feeling of group unity which entails common interests,
goals, and responsibilities.
DISCIPLINE Systematic training or subjection to authority.
INITIATIVE An introductory step or action; a first move.
LEADERSHIP - Ability to lead so as to exact maximum effort toward
achieving objectives on the battlefield.
MORALE- Mental condition in a group which consists of cheerfulness
and confidence.
TRAINING! EXPERIENCE - Individual and unit training as related to the
level of expertse achieved.
WILL MOTIVATION - Willingness to do whatever is necessary to fight
and win.
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Part II - TASK FORCE SCENARIO
*; Task Force MECH, a mechanized infantry battalion task force, has been
given the mission to secure the Brigade Rear Area against possible
attacks by both conventional and unconventional forces. You are the
Battery Commander of C Battery, 1-22 Field Artillery.
I0 The enemy main body is not expected to cross the Inter-German border
for 48 hours, however intelligence indicates that unconventional force
raids consisting of 5-30 men can occur at any time. Given the enemy's
current capability, indications are that he will target key logistical and
C2 facilities through repeated attacks well in advance of his main effort.
0 In a conventional attack, it is anticipated that the enemy will employ
chemical agents and, as a result the Task Force Commander has ordered
the extended wear of MOPP suits, although boots, gloves and masks are to
be carried until needed.
0 The Task Force Commander currently anticipates having to protect the
designated key assets with 360 degree security, including protection
against possible airborne insertions. He expects to have to fight the rear
area battle for the next 36-48 hours. The Task Force has been given a
contingency mission to be prepared to move into blocking positions in the
event of enemy penetration of forward defenses.
; The enemy can establish local air superiority for limited periods.
I Terrain - rolling hills with densely forested areas. Urban spread and
areas of 500 - 2,000 generally separated by 3-5 kilometers. Open areas
are mostly agricultural lands occupied by cattle farmers.
0 Weathe, -1-:4, ,",vs and cool nig""-' temperatures range from 42 - 73
degrees (F). Fog in low lying areas in early morning hours. No precipitation
expected over the next 72 hours.
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Part III - BATrERY SITUATION
* You are the Charlie Battery Commander which currently consists of:
1st Platoon, C/1-22 Artillery (organic)
2nd Platoon, C/1-22 Artillery (organic)
Maintenance Team, 1-22 Artillery (attached)
I You have been in command of this battery for the past 13 months.
I Your battery CP location is approximately 65 kilometers from the
Inter-German Border (IGB).
( You are in a direct support posture. Your primary mission is to provide
artillery support for Task Force MECH which has responsibility for the
security of t:-,e Brigade Rear Area. As a contingency mission, you have been
told to be prepared to deploy well forward in the event that the Red Hoard
should breakthrough forward defenses.
I0 Although you have not specifically trained for the rear area missions,
you realize that being able to provide artillery fire in all directions as
required in this environment are similar to those experienced in other
missions for which you consider your battery fully trained.
0 You have what you consider to be a well-trained chain of command
which you believe adapts well to changing situations.
L Equipment is 100% operational; personnel strength is 100%.
I > Do not consider the success or failure of the Non-Combatant
Evacuation (NEO) plan in the ranking of the human factors listed.
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Case Number I
Your situation remains as indicated above.
C Battery has just arrived in the AA (assembly area) when you receive
orders to deploy one platoon forward immediately to support a portion of
Task Force MECH who are guarding an ASP (ammunition supply point).
I The 1st and 2nd platoon leaders have been in the battalion for five
months, but have only been with the battery for eight days and you are not
yet sure of their capabilities in leading a firing platoon.
f Although, you have faith in the abilities of both firing platoons, you
must now make the decision on which platoon to deploy forward in support
of this critical mission, considering the platoon will be acting
independently from the battery.
i How Important is each of the human factors listed below (as
possessed by the unit or individuals within the unit) to you, as the
commander, In the formulation of this reduced-time decision?
Very Very
important Imortat Neutral Unmportant Unimportant
COHESION () () () () ()
DISCIPLINE () () () () ()
INITIATIVE ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
LEADERSHIP () () () () ()
MORALE () () () () ()
TRAININGI
EXPERIENCE () () () () ()
WILLI
MOTIVATION () () () () ()
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Case Number 2
You chose the 1st platoon to deploy forward in support of Task Force
MECH. Meanwhile, political tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
have peaked and negotiations appear to be breaking down. At this point,
your intel assets indicate a conventional attack will occur within the next
24 hours and that possible airborne insertions could occur sooner on key
logistical sites.
I An airborne insertion has just occurred at the ASP and Task Force MECH
defending it is engaging the enemy. The 1st platoon Is firing artillery in
support of the task force. Should this ASP be captured or destroyed, 70%
of the brigades ammunition would be lost. Therefore, this mission has
high priority. Suddenly, 1st platoon starts receiving both machine gun and
indirect fire.
I You must decide whether to displace 1st platoon to an alternate
position and stop firing: which means the task force is without artillery
support for a short time and the ASP could be lost or to continue the
artillery fires and defend yourself the best you can.
I How Important Is each of the human factors listed below (as
possessed by the unit or individuals within the unit) to you, as the
commander, In the formulation of this reduced-time decision?
Very Very
Important Imgnrtant Nut[al Ltapmani Unimpra
COHESION () () () () ()
DISCIPLINE () () () () ()
INITIATIVE () () () () ()
LEADERSHIP () () () () ()
MORALE () () () () ()
TRA ININGI
EXPERIENCE ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
WILL/
MOTIVATION () () () () ()
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Case Number 3
1st platoon was left in position to continue their artillery support and
repeled the ground force attackers.
I Reports coming from the forward defense units is that they are
receiving intense, concentrated artillery fire. This is prep fire for the
Pact's first echelon forces as they have started their rapid advance
toward the border.
4 You receive a report that 2 large rockets have landed 3 kilometers
upwind of the battery location. If this is a chemical round, you're not
really sure that the vapor cloud would reach your position. You realize that
if you go to full MOPP now, your soldier's performance will be degraded
severly. You are fully confident in the chemical detection devices that you
have emplaced on your battery perimeter.
i You must now decide whether to go to full MOPP and accept the
degradation in performance or take the chance that the rockets were not
chemical rockets.
f How Important is each of the human factors listed below (as
possessed by the unit or individuals within the unit) to you, as the
commander, in the formulation of this reduced-time decision?
Very Very
Important Important Neutral Unimport Unimorta
COHESION () () () () ()
DISCIPLINE () () () () ()
INITIATIVE () () () () ()
LEADERSHIP () () () () ()
MORALE () () () () ()
TRA ININGI
EXPERIENCE () () () () ()
WILLI
MOTIVATION () () () () ()
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Case Number 4
You made the choice not to go into full MOPP.
In the interim, the Pact is making an all out attempt to penetrate
NATO's forward defenses.
One of your sister unit's firing positions has just sustained a direct hit
by a non-persistent nerve agent. As a result, you have been ordered to re-
distribute your forces by moving one platoon into that position to "defend
and assess/evacuate casualties and ensure the security of the nuclear
rounds." Latest reports are that the battery has sustained 60 - 75 KIA's.
f You must decide which platoon to send to handle the position
defense/casualty assessment mission.
f How Important is each of the human factors listed below (as
possessed by the unit or individuals within the unit) to you, as the
commander, In the formulation ct this reduced-time decision?
Very Very
Imnortant Important Neutral Unimnan Unimnortant
COHESION () () () () (1
DISCIPLINE ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
INITIATIVE () () () () ()
LEADERSHIP () () () () ()
MORALE () () () () ()
TRAININGI
EXPERIENCE () () () () ()
WILLI
IOTIVATION () () () () ()
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Part 11 - SPECIAL INFORMATION
CURRENT GRADE Icircle one): 0-2 0-3 0-4 0-5
BRANCH/SPECIALTY:
TIME ON ACTIVE DUTY: _ years _ months
TIME SPENT IN COMMAND: _ years _ months
TIME SPENT AS A STAFF OFFICER: _ years - months
COMBAT VETERAN (circle one): YES NO
IF YES, WHERE: HOW LONG:.
SURUEV EFFECTIVENESS
1. Were the situations presented understandable?
(Yes or No - circle one) If not, why not?
2. Would you say that the situations presented were realistic?
(Yes or No - circle one) If not, why not?
3. What assumptions did you have to make in order to complete this
survey?
I I O
APPENDIX D. PROGRAM LISTINGS
The following is a complete listing of the APL (A Programming Language)
programs used in transforming survey results to interval scales. These programs
were developed by Professor Glenn F. Lindsay, an operations research instructor
at the Naval Postgraduate School.
To use these programs, one must input the following values:
" N = Number of instances
* M = Number of categories
" R = A vector of consecutive rows of the raw frequency matrix data
From this data, the PMATRICE R function will give the matrix of cumulatcd
proportions P. If these values satisfy the requirements of being greater than 0.02
and less than 0.98, then the SCALE P function will compute the category
bounds, standard deviations, and scaled values for the instances.
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A. PMATRICE R FUNCTION



















This function converts the PMATRICE R data into their corresponding z
values from the Normal distribution table computations.
VNQUANE£0]V
V Q+-NQUAN P;CO;C1;C2;Di;D2;D3;V;PP;T
[I] A P IS A VECTOR OF PROBABILITIES

















This function computes the bounds and the standard deviations between the
























D. SCALE P FUNCTION
This function combines the previous functions to present the upper bounds,
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APPENDIX E. SURVEY RESULTS
The following tables represent raw, refined, and ranked data. All of the ser-
vices data is shown, however, only the Army Total category will be presented in
its entirety with initial and final data results for the other services.
A. RESULTS - SURVEY I
Table 27. SURVEY I - OVERHEAD
Number Number Percent Average 1Range ofSEVIE. ime .'r.'_SERVICE Distributed Returned Returned in Service in Service
5 years
8 months
Total 147 101 68.72 9 years, to
4 months 17 years,
7 months
5 years
Army Combat 71.43 9 years, 9 months
Arms 1 month 17 years,
7 months
5 years
Non- 9 years, 8 months




7 years, 8 months
Air Force 70 32 55.99 8 months to













1. Raw Frequency Results
The following tables show the raw data collected for Survey I in the fol-
lowing order:
* Army Total
* Army Combat Arms





Table 28. SURVEY I RESULTS - ARMY TOTAL
HUMAN FACTOR Very Not VeryUnimportant Important Important Important
Cognitive Factor 1 23 67 10
Cohesion 0 1 28 72
Combat Experience 1 20 51 29
Comradeship 1 17 62 21
Confinement 9 67 20 5
Cowardliness 3 26 52 20
Discipline 1 0 21 79
Emotion 1 19 62 19
Energy 0 2 44 55
Fear 2 22 65 12
Honor 2 17 55 27
Initiative 0 0 21 80
Intuition 0 14 51 36
Isolation 1 37 45 18
Jet La 7 48 43 3
Leadcrship 0 0 6 95
Mentalfatigue 1 3 44 53
Morale 0 0 35 66
National Characteristics 6 42 46 7
Physical Fatigue 0 1 57 43
Sleep Loss 0 3 49 49
Social Motivation 5 22 51 23
Stress 0 2 64 35
Surprise 0 10 52 39
Training/Experience 0 0 19 82
Uncertainty 0 23 68 10
ifill//.loti'ation 0 4 29 68
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Table 29. SURVEY I RESULTS - ARMY COMBAT ARMS
Very Not Important Very
HUMAN FACTOR Unimportant Important Important
Cognitive Factor 1 16 32 6
Cohesion 0 0 16 39
Combat Experience 1 11 25 18
Comradeship 1 10 30 14
Confinement 7 35 10 3
Cowardliness 1 18 27 9
Discipline 1 0 11 43
Emotion 1 10 36 8
Energ" 0 0 26 29
Fear 2 8 38 7
Honor 2 14 27 12
Initiative 0 0 12 43
Intuition 0 8 28 19
Isolation 0 19 27 9
Jet Lag 4 27 23 1
Leadership 0 0 3 52
Mental Fatigue 0 0 23 32
Morale 0 0 15 40
National Characteristics 2 26 22 5
Physical Fatigue 0 0 32 23
Sleep Loss 0 1 25 29
Social Motivation 4 17 26 8
Stress 0 1 36 18
Surprise 0 6 28 21
Training/Experience 0 0 9 46
Uncertainty 0 14 33 8
Will/IIotivation 0 3 16 36
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Table 30. SURVEY I RESULTS - ARMY NON-COMBAT ARMS
HUMAN FACTOR Very Not VeryUnimportant Important Important Important
Cognitive Factor 0 7 35 4
Cohesion 0 1 12 33
Combat Experience 0 9 26 11
Comradeship 0 7 32 7
Confinement 2 32 10 2
Cowardliness 2 8 25 if
Discipline 0 0 10 36
Emotion 0 9 26 11
Energy 0 2 18 26
Fear 0 14 27 5
Honor 0 3 28 15
Initiative 0 0 9 37
Intuition 0 6 23 17
Isolation 1 18 18 9
Jet Lag 3 21 20 2
Leadcrship 0 0 3 43
Iental Fazigue 1 3 21 21
Morale 0 0 20 26
National Characteristics 4 16 24 2
Physical Fatigue 0 1 25 20
Sleep Loss 0 2 24 20
Social .otivation 1 5 25 15
Stress 0 1 28 17
Surprise 0 4 24 18
Training/Experience 0 0 10 36
Uncertainty 0 9 35 2
Illllotiation 0 1 13 32
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Table 31. SURVEY I RESULTS - AIR FORCE
HUMAN FACTOR Very Not Important VeryUnimportant Important Important
Cognitive Factor 0 3 22 7
Cohesion 0 0 5 27
Combat Experience 0 2 20 10
Comradeship 0 6 19 7
Confinement 2 14 14 2
Cowardliness 1 7 18 6
Discipline 0 0 11 21
Emotion 0 4 19 9
Ene,:l" 0 1 11 20
Fear 0 I1 18 3
Honor 0 8 13 11
Initiative 0 2 6 24
Intuition 0 5 12 15
Isolation 0 9 20 3
Jet Lag 1 11 17 3
Leadership 0 1 6 25
Mental fatigue 0 0 18 14
1orale 0 0 10 22
A'ational Characteristics 0 15 15 2
Physical Fatigue 0 1 21 10
Sleep Loss 0 2 23 7
Social Motivation 0 6 16 10
Stress 0 3 21 8
Surprise 0 1 18 13
Training/Experience 0 0 12 20
Uncertainty 0 9 18 5
l711/Motivation 0 0 7 25
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Table 32. SURVEY I RESULTS - MARINE CORPS
HUMAN FACTOR Very Not VeryUnimportant Important Important Important
Cognitive Factor 1 1 36 6
Cohesion 0 0 16 45
Combat Experience 1 10 29 21
Comradeship I 20 25 15
Confinement 7 33 17 4
Cowardliness 4 16 25 16
Discipline 0 0 12 49
Emotion 2 12 31 16
Energy 0 3 20 38
Fear 2 13 31 15
Honor 1 13 31 16
Initiative 0 0 11 50
Intuition 1 1 22 37
Isolation 4 24 25 8
Jet Lag 4 35 19 3
Leadership 0 1 7 53
Mental Fatigue 0 1 32 28
MXorale 0 0 19 42
National Characteristics 3 25 28 5
Physical Fatigue 0 1 36 24
Sleep Loss 0 4 40 17
Social ,1otivation 1 18 32 10
Stress 0 2 41 18
Surprise 0 1 33 27
Training/Expericnce 0 1 11 49
Uncertainty 1 12 37 1
|'ill/.lotiation 2 2 11 46
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Table 33. SURVEY I RESULTS - NAVY
HUMANFACTOR Ver Not Important VeryUnimportant Important Important
Cognithe Factor 5 7 39 12
Cohesion 1 1 17 44
Combat Experience 1 12 30 20
Comradeship 2 14 38 9
Confinement 1I 28 21 3
Cowardliness 8 13 27 15
Discipline 0 3 12 48
Emotion 1 9 38 15
Encig" 0 2 27 34
Fear 3 18 35 7
Honor 0 10 30 23
Initiative 0 0 13 50
Intuition 1 5 23 34
Isolation 5 23 27 8
Jet Lag 7 31 21 4
Leadership 0 0 9 54
Mjental Fatigue 2 2 38 21
Morale 0 1 20 42
'ational Characteristics 4 23 25 11
Physical Fatigue 1 2 37 23
Skep Loss 1 3 46 13
Social Motivation 4 15 26 18
Stress 1 6 37 19
Surprise 1 9 33 20
Training/Experience 0 1 25 37
Uncertainty 0 20 37 6
Wil/M, 1 lo tiaton 0 1 19 43
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2. Refined Frequency Results
A walk-through is initially presented which shows the steps taken in at-
taining scaled values for the Army Total respondent category. This is depicted
in the tables which follow, showing a logical progression of steps taken to obtain
values on a common scale. Most of this data is the resultant output after using
the categorical judgments APL programs. Following the computations, scaled
data, transformed data, and rankings for all services are listed. The last table
shows an overall Interservice Rank Comparison of the human factors from Sur-
vey I.
i65
Table 34. RELATIVE FREQUENCIES - ARMY TOTALT
HUMAN FACTOR Very Not I VeryUnimportant Important Important Important
Cognitive Factor 0.009 0.221 0.670 0.100
Cohesion 0 0.009 0.277 0.714
Combat Experience 0.009 0.191 0.510 0.288
Comradeship 0.009 0.161 0.620 0.208
Confinement 0.089 0.663 0.198 0.050
Cowardliness 0.030 0.257 0.515 0.198
Discipline 0.009 0 0.208 0.783
Emotion 0.009 0.181 0.620 0.188
Encr" 0 0.020 0.435 0.544
Fear 0.020 0.218 0,644 0.118
Honor 0.020 0.168 0.545 0.267
Initiative 0 0 0.208 0.792
Intuition 0 0.139 0.505 0.356
Isolation 0.009 0.361 0.450 0.179
.Jct Lag 0.069 0.475 0.426 0.030
Leadership 0 0 0.059 0.941
Mcnial Fatieuc 0.009 0.030 0.436 0.525
.3lorale 0 0 0.347 0.653
.National Characteristics 0.059 0.416 0.455 0.070
Physical Fatigue 0 0.009 0.564 0.427
Sleep Loss 0 0.030 0.485 0.485
Social .Motivation 0.050 0.218 0.505 0.227
Stress 0 0.020 0.633 0.346
Surprise 0 0.100 0.514 0.385
Training/Experience 0 0 0.188 0.812
UncertaintY 0 0.228 0.6 73 0.099
S'ili/,1 lot ivation 0 0.040 0.28 7 0.6 73
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Table 35. CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES - ARMY TOTAL
HUMAN FACTOR Very Not Iportant VeryUnimportant Important Important
Cognitive Factor 0.009 0.230 0.900 1
Cohesion 0 0.009 0.286 1
Combat Experience 0.009 0.200 0.710 1
Comradeship 0.009 0.170 0.790 1
Confinement 0.089 0.752 0.950 1
Cowardliness 0.030 0.287 0.802 1
Discipline 0.009 0.009 0.217 1
Emotion 0.009 0.190 0.810 1
Energy 0 0.020 0.455 1
Fear 0.020 0.238 0.882 1
Honor 0.020 0.188 0.733 1
Inidative 0 0 0.208 1
Intuition 0 0.139 0.644 1
Isolation 0.009 0.3 70 0.820 1
Jet Lag 0.069 0.544 0.970 1
Leadership 0 0 0.059 1
Mental Fat rue 0.009 0.030 0.470 1
Morale 0 0 0.347 1
Aational Characteristics 0.059 0.475 0.930 1
Physical Fatigue 0 0.009 0.573 1
Sleep Loss 0 0.030 0.515 1
Social Motivation 0.050 0.268 0.773 1
Stress 0 0.020 0.653 1
Surprise 0 0.100 0.614 1
Training/Experience 0 0 0.188 1
U1ncertainty 0 0.228 0.901 1
ill! lo tivation 0 0.040 0.32 7 1
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Table 36. REMOVE Pij > 0.98 AND P,0 < 0.02 - SCALE I
-UMAN FACTOR Very NotUnimportant Important Important
Confinement 0.089 0.752 0.950
Cowardliness 0.030 0.287 0.802
Fear 0.020 0.238 0.882
Honor 0.020 0.188 0.733
Jet Lag 0.069 0.544 0.970
National Characteristics 0.059 0.475 0.930
Social Motivation 0.050 0.268 0.773
Table 37. REMOVE P,, > 0.98 AND P, < 0.02 -
SCALE 2
HUMAN FACTOR NotImportant Important
Cognitive Factor 0.230 0.900






Mental Fatigue 0.030 0.470






Table 38. REMOVE P,, > 0.98










Table 39. NORMALIZE - SCALE I
Very Not Important
HUMAN FACTOR Unimportant Important
Confinement -1.346 0.682 1.650
Cowardliness -1.886 -0.561 0.849
Fear -2.058 -0.714 1.181
Honot -2.058 -0.885 0.621
Jet Lag -1.481 0.112 1.886
National Characteristics -1.560 -0.062 1.481
Social Mlotivation -1.650 -0.621 0.746
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Table 40. NORMALIZE - SCALE 2
HUMAN FACTOR Not ImportantImportant ott
Cognitive Factor -0.738 1.282




Intuition -1.08 7 0.368
Isolation -0.331 0.915
Mental Fatigue -1.881 -0.075
Sleep Loss -1.886 0.037
Stress -2.058 0.394
Suirp ise -1.287 0.28 9
Uncertainty -0.746 1.287
IJll/.lotiration -1.756 -0.449










Table 42. GRAND AVERAGE - SCALE I
Very Not Row Row
HUMAN F.,tCTOR Unimpor- Important Important Total Averagetant (.
Confinement -1.346 0.682 1.650 0.986 0.329
Cowardliness -1.886 -0.561 0.849 -1.599 -0.533
Fear -2.058 -0.714 1.181 -1.590 -0.530
Honor -2.058 -0.885 0.621 -2.322 -0.774
Jet Lag -1.481 0.112 1.886 0.517 0.172
National Characteristics -1.560 -0.062 1.481 -0.141 -0.047




Column -1.720 -0.293 1.202 Average: b =-0.270
Areragcs: b, 1
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Table 43. GRAND AVERAGE - SCALE 2
Not Row RowHUMAN FACTOR Important Important Total Average
Cognitive Factor -0.738 1.282 0.544 0.272
Combat Experience -0.841 0.553 -0.288 -0.144
Comradeship -0.954 0.806 -0.148 -0.074
Emotion -0.878 0.878 0 0
Energy -2.058 -0.112 -2.170 -1.085
Intuition -1.087 0.368 -0.719 -0.359
Isolation -0.331 0.915 0.584 0.292
Mental Fatigue -1.881 -0.075 -1.956 -0.978
Sleep Loss -1.886 0.037 -1.849 -0.924
Stress -2.058 0.394 -1.664 -0.832
Surprise -1.287 0.289 -0.998 -0.499
Uncertainty -0.746 1.287 0.541 0.271
flil,131oeiration -1.756 -0.449 -2.205 -1.102
ColumnTotals 
-16.501 6.173TotalsGrand
Column .1.269 0.475 Average: b -0.397
Average: b-7
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Table 44. GRAND AVERAGE - SCALE 3
Row Row
HUMAN FACTOR Important Total Average
Cohesion .0.561 0.561 0.561
Discipline -0.779 -0.779 -0.779
Initiative 0.815 -0.815 -0.815
Leadership -1.560 -1.560 -1.560
Morale -0.400 -0.400 0.400
Physical Fatigue 0.187 0.187 0.187




A agcs: h 0.688
Table 45. UPPER BOUNDS - COLUMN AVERAGES
Very Not
Unimportant Important Important
Scale 1 -1.720 -0.293 1.202
Scale 2 NA -1.269 0.475
Scale 3 NA NA -0.688
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The sum of squares for the column differences are computed using the following
general equation:
B - (bj-b)2 .
For Scales 1 and 2, the sum of the squares for column differences are:
M-k
B(Scale 1)= Z (bj -)2
j=1
= ( -1.720 - (-0.270))2 + ( -0.293 - ( -0.270))2
+ (1.202 - (-0.270))2
= 4.269
m-k
B(Scale 2) = _(b )2
j= I
= (-1.269 - ( -0.397))2 + (0.475 - (-0.397))2
= 1.521
Table 46. SUM OF SQUARE DIFFERENCES - SCALE I
Aij = (zij - i),
hUMAN FACTOR Very Not 
Ai = E4.
__U___ A____FA___TOR__ Unimportant Important Important
confin'mcnt 2.805 0.125 1.745 4.675
Cowardliness 1.831 0.001 1.909 3.741
Fear 2.335 0.034 2.927 5.296
Honor 1.648 0.013 1.946 3.607
Jet Lag 2.733 0.003 2.937 5.673
National Characteristics 2.289 0.001 2.334 4.624
Social Motiration 1.304 0.013 1.572 2.889
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Table 47. SUM OF SQUARE DIFFERENCES - SCALE 2
A= (z, - Y)'
Not i  .A
HUMAN FACTOR Important Important A
Combat Experience 1.02 1.02 2.02
Cognitire Factor 0.485 0.485 0.970
Comradeship 0.774 0.774 1.548
Emotion 0.770 0.770 1.540
Energy 0.946 0.946 1.892
Intuition 0.529 0.529 1.058
Isolation 0.388 0.388 0.776
Mental Fatigue 0.815 0.815 1.630
Slcep Loss 0.925 0.925 1.850
Stress 1.503 1.503 3.006
Surprise 0.621 0.621 1.242
Uncertainty 1.032 1.032 2.064
Will/Motivation 0.427 0.427 0.854
Table 48. SCALED VALUES - SCALE 1
IIU.MAN FACTOR b- ",,BtA, Si
Confinement -0.270 - (0.329 \/4.269/4.675 ) -0.584
Cowardliness -0.270 - (-0.533 /4.269/3.741 ) 0.299
Fear -0.270 - (-0.530 /4.269/5.296 ) 0.206
Honor -0.270 - (-0.774 ./4.269/3.607 ) 0.572
Jet Lag -0.270 - (0.172 /4.269/5.673 ) -0.419
National Characteristics -0.270 - (-0.047 ./4.269/4.624 ) -0.225
Social Motivation -0.270 - (-0.508 ,/4.269/2.889 ) 0.347
175
Table 49. SCALED VALUES - SCALE 2
HUMAN FACTOR b - Z'NI-- S,
Combat Experience -0.397 - (-0.272 /1.521/2.020 ) -0.632
Cognitive Factor -0.397 - (-0.144 /1.521/0.970 ) -0.217
Comr: leship -0.397 - (-0.074 /1.521/1.548 ) -0.324
Emotion -0.397 - (0 %1.521/1.540 ) -0.397
Energy -0.397 - (-1.085 VI.521/1.892 ) 0.575
Intuition -0.397 - (-0.359 ,/1.521/1.058 ) 0.0337
Isolation -0.397 - (.0.292 /1.521/0.776 ) -0.806
Mlcntal Fatigue -0.397 - (-0.978 /1.521/1.630 ) 0.547
Sleep Loss -0.397 - (-0.924 \/I.521/i.850 ) 0.441
Stress -0.397 - (-0.832 /1.521/3.006 ) 0.1953
Surprise -0.397 - (-0.499 /1.521/1.242 ) 0.1556
Uncertainty -0.397 - (0.270 .1.521/2.064 ) -0.629
If illi'Motiration -0.397 - (-1.102 1.52110.854 ) 1.073
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Table 50. SCALED VALUES - SCALE 3
HUMAN FACTOR b -
Cohesion -0.688 - (-0.561) -0.127
Discipline -0.688 -(-0.779) 0.091
Initiative -0.688 - (-0.815) 0.127
Leadership -0.688 - (-1 560) 0.872
Morale -0.688 - (-0.400) -0.288
Physical Fatigue -0.688 - (0.187) -0.875
Training/Expetience -0.688 - (-0.885) 0.197
The final product of this outlined procedure are the scaled values of the
instances which are on the same interval scale as the category bounds, b,. With
this scale established, a linear transformation may be performed using the general
formula:
y = a + fix, fl > 0
which will adjust the scale as dcsired. By establishing this linear transformation
equation and letting x represent the raw or scaled data and y represent the
transformed data, the level of magnitude for each factor can be determined.
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The simultaneous equations for Scale 1 are:
100 = cx + P(1.202)
0 = o + P( -1.720)
and transformed values are given in Table 51.
Table 51. TRANSFORMED DATA - SCALE 1





Jet Lag -0.419 44.862
National Charactcristics -0.225 51.552
Socal Aotirvation 0.34; 71.2 76
Upper Bound 1.202 100
Middle Bound -0.293 49.207
Lower Boind -1.720 0
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The simultaneous equations for Scale 2 are:
100 = a + #(0.475)
49.207 = a + fl( -1.269)
and transformed values are given in Table 52.
Table 52. TRANSFORMED DATA - SCALE 2
HUMAN FACTOR x Value y Value
Cognitive Factor -0.632 67.441






Mental Fatigue 0.547 102.118





Upper Bound 0.475 100
Lower Bound -1.269 49.207
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Table 53 represents the values determined using the regression technique on the
Special Transformation Case. The third point used in the technique came from
Scale 2.
Table 53. TRANSFORMED DATA - SCALE 3






Physical Fatigue -0.875 84.010
Training/ Experience 0.197 189.180
Lppcr Bound -0.688 100
Rescaled Value -0.550 117.588
Lover Bound -1.720 0
The transformed data along with the ranking of each of the human fac-
tors are shown in the following tables. One can see how the categorical judgment
technique obtains a numerical value and, as a result, a ranking structure for each
factor. It should be noted here that the rankings and transformed values of the
factors used are relative to the other factors.
Table 54. TRANSFORMED DATA - ARMY TOTAL
HUMAN FACTOR Scaled Transformed RankingData Data
Cognitive Factor -0.632 67.441 22
Cohesion -0.12 7 158.920 5
Combat Experience -0.217 79.647 15
Comradeship -0.324 76.500 17
Confinement -0.584 39.172 27
Cowardliness 0.299 69.621 20
Discipline 0.091 181.740 4
Emotion -0.397 74.353 18
Energ" 0.575 102.941 8
Fear 0.206 66.414 23
Honor 0.572 79.034 16
Initiative 0.127 182.240 3
Intuition 0.033 87.029 13
Isolation -0.806 62.323 24
Jet Lag -0.419 44.862 26
Leadership 0.872 256.160 1
Mental Fatigue 0.547 102.118 9
Morale -0.288 141.000 6
Aational Characteristics -0.225 51.552 25
Physical Fatigue -0.875 84.010 14
Sleep Loss 0.441 99.000 10
Social Motivation 0.347 71.276 19
Stress 0.195 91.745 i1
Surprise 0.155 90.588 12
Training/Experience 0.197 189.180 2
Uncertainty -0.629 6 7.529 21
U ill/M1ot1ivation 1.073 117.580 7
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Table 55. TRANSFORMED DATA - ARMY COMBAT ARMS
HUMIAN FACTOR Scaled Transformed RankingData Data
Cognitive Factor -0.082 62532 22
Cohesion -0.023 141.435 6
Combat Experience 0.427 80.721 15
Comradesip 0.301 76.414 16
Confinement -0.858 34.821 27
Cowardliness -0.006 65.264 21
Discipline 2.589 157.939 4
Emotion 0.089 68.650 19
Energy -0503 104.067 9
Fear 0.021 66.221 20
Honor 0.105 69.204 17
Initiative 0.207 159.341 3
Intuition -0.075 90.116 12
Isolation -0.817 62.088 23
Jet Lag -0.673 41.414 26
Leadership 1.027 223.179 1
Mental Fatigue -0.368 114.577 8
Morale -0.515 145.717 5
National Characteristics -0.334 53.529 25
Physical Fatigue -0.779 82380 14
Sleep Loss 0.445 101.755 10
Social Motivation -0.204 58.182 24
Stress 0.090 90.594 11
Surprise 0.056 89325 13
Training/Experience 0.407 174.911 2
Uncertainty -0.654 67.201 18
11 "i1ll1thation 0.946 117.497 7
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Table 56. TRANSFORMED DATA - ARMY NON-COMBAT ARMS
HUMAN FACTOR Scaled Transformed RankingData Data
Cognitive Factor -0.577 70.356 20
Cohesion 1.220 120.684 4
Combat Experience -0.359 76.448 16
Comradeship -0.447 73.983 18
Confinement -0.554 43.250 26
Cowardliness 0.229 73.725 19
Discipline -0.039 188.810 3
Emotion -0.359 76.445 17
Encr. 0.6 78 105.496 7
Fear -0.831 63.221 23
Honor 0.055 88.059 14
inifiathie 0.041 197.912 2
Intuition 0.057 88.118 13
Isolation 0.061 65.211 22
Jcr Lag -0.457 46.725 25
Leadership 0.691 271.864 1
Mental Fatgue 1.019 99.432 8
Morale -0.654 118.840 6
National Characteristics -0.440 47.321 24
Physical Fatigue 0.342 96.087 10
Sleep Loss 0.319 95.445 9
Social Motivation 0.623 85.293 15
Stress 0.219 92.636 11
Surprise 0.168 91.227 12
Training/Experience -0.039 188.810 3
Uncertainty -0.756 65.328 21
iil[/.llotivation 1.111 117.636 5
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Table 57. TRANSFORMED DATA - AIR FORCE
HUMAN FACTOR Scaled Transformed RankingData Data
Cognitine Factor -0.110 80.519 18
Cohesion 0.536 175.630 1
Combat Experience 0.106 87.315 12
Comradeship -0.271 75.465 20
Confinement -0.279 49.143 27
Cowardliness 0.319 69.097 21
Discipline -0.071 129.140 6
Emotion -0.050 82.409 14
Lncrgy 0.854 110.852 8
Fear -0.772 59.698 24
Honor -0.115 80.371 19
Initiative 1.821 141.248 3
Intuition 0.389 96.236 9
Isolation -0.653 63.459 23
Jet Lag -0.008 58.190 25
Leadership 1.705 137.588 4
Mcntal Fatigue -0.631 86.260 13
Morale -0.016 133.350 5
National Characteristics -1.082 49.959 26
Physical Fatigue 0.162 89.091 11
Sleep Loss -0.052 82346 15
Social Motivation -0.084 81.337 17
Stress -0.056 82.214 16
Surprise 0.321 94.085 10
Training/Experience -0.154 122.790 7
Uncertainty -0.554 66.572 22
I 1'illf lotivation 0.302 157.710 2
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Table 58. TRANSFORMED DATA - MARINE CORPS
HUMAN FACTOR Scaled Transformed RakingData Data
Cognitive Factor -0.209 62.658 23
Cohesion -0.084 155.629 5
Combat Experience 0.365 84.483 15
Comradeship 0.019 71.312 20
Confinement -0.778 41.011 27
Cowardliness -0.012 70.164 21
Discipline 0.134 174.822 2
Emotion 0.136 75.795 17
Ener"g 0.358 111.875 9
Fear 0.087 73.916 18
Honor 0.158 76.608 16
Initiative 0.193 180.017 1
Intuition 1.305 120.232 8
Isolation -0.387 55.894 24
Jet Lag -0.688 44.437 26
Leadership 1.997 156.297 4
Mcntal Fatigue -0.167 97.653 10
Morale -0.230 142.774 6
National Characteristics -0.446 53.654 25
Physical Fatigue -0.292 94.274 12
Sleep Loss -0.606 85.745 14
Social Motivation -0.087 67.304 22
Stress -0.506 88.474 13
Surprise -0.199 96.772 II
Training/Experience 1.170 133.982 7
Uncertainty 0.028 71.662 19
JT'il/.1 lotivation 2.42 7 162.894 3
185
Table 59. TRANSFORMED DATA - NAVY_____________
HUMIAN FACTOR Scaled Transformed RankingData Data
Cognitive factor -0.129 65.91 1 19
Cohesion 1.551 133.629 4
Combat Experience 0.172 78.044 15
Comradeship -0.207 62.682 20
Confinement -0.951 32.754 27
Cowardliness -0.23 7 61.540 21
Discipline 1.14 7 145.803 3
Emotion 0.085 74.536 17
Energy 0.049 103 .456 9
Fear -0.36 7 56.282 23
Honor -0.449 84.197 12
Initiatve -0.125 201.820 2
Intuition 0.8 19 104.129 8
Isolation -0.486 51.484 25
Jet Lag -0.792 39.177 26
Leaders hip 0.125 233.700 1
M1ental fatigue 0.376 86 .238 if
.llorale 0.359 115.3 94 6
National Characteristics -0.359 56.597 22
Physical Fatigue 0.474 90.2 14 10
Sleep Loss 0.141 76.766 16
Social Motivation -0.030 69.8 75 18
Stress 0.25 7 81.456 13
Surprise 0.228 80.2 70 14
Training/Experience 0.142 10 7.004 7
Uncertainty -1.211 54.788 24
11'ill/Motivation 0.411 117.421 5
186
Table 60. SURVEY I RESULTS - INTERSERVICE RANK COMPARISON
Army
HUMAN FACTOR Non- Air v Marine
Total Combat Combat Force Nay CorpsArms Arms
Leadership I 1 1 4 1 4
Training/Expcrience 2 2 3.5 7 7 7
initiatire 3 3 2 3 2 1
Discipline 4 4 3.5 6 3 2
Cohesion 5 6 5 1 4 5
Morale 6 5 7 5 6 6
ii ill/Motivation 7 7 6 2 5 3
Energy 8 9 8 8 9 9
Mental Fatigue 9 8 9 13 11 10
Sleep Loss 10 10 10 15 16 14
Stress 11 1I 12 16 13 13
Surprise 12 13 13 10 14 11
Intuition 13 12 14 9 8 8
P.ysi,-2' Fort- I 14 1 II 10 12
Combat Experience 15 15 17 12 15 15
Honor 16 17 15 19 12 16
Comradeship 17 16 19 20 20 20
Emotion 18 19 18 14 17 17
Social .1Motivation 19 24 16 17 18 22
Cowardliness 20 21 20 21 21 21
Uncertainty 21 18 22 22 24 19
Cognitive Factor 22 22 21 18 19 23
Fear 23 20 24 24 23 18
Isolation 24 23 23 23 25 24
National Characteristics 25 25 25 26 22 25
Jet Lag 26 26 26 25 26 26
Confinement 27 27 27 27 27 27
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B. RESULTS - SURVEY 11
This appendix contains the data obtained from Survey II. The sample pop-
ulation has been grouped as follows:








The data collected will be shown for each group first as raw data. From the
raw data. the categorical judgement method was employed to derive scaled values
from each group. Next the actual ranking-of the factors for each case and group
will be illustrated.
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Table 61. SURVEY II - OVERHEAD - INFANTRY VERSION
RESPONDENT Number Number Percent Average Range of
GROUP Distributed Returned Returned Time Timein Service in Service
5 years
9 years, 4 months
Total 65 42 65 2 years, to
__________________ _______ ________ _______ 2 monmonts 13 years,
11 months
6 I6ears




Non-Infantry 43 27 63 9 mears, to1oh 13 years.
I1I months
Table 62. SUTRVEY II - OVERHEAD - ARTILLERY VERSION
RESPONDENT Number Number Percent Average Range ofGROUP Distributed Returned Returned Time TimeRE S O N D E N D si n S c r v ic e i n S e r i i c e
6 years
9 years, o months









Non-Arrillery 48 24 50 5 mars, to
5 months 17 years,
0 months
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1. Infantry Version Results
On the following pages are the raw and refined results for the Infantry
Version of Survey II. Raw frequency results for Total, Infantry, and Non-
Infantry respondents are shown in Tables 63, 64, and 65, respectively. This is
followed by tables depicting the scaled values and rank orders on a case-by-case
basis.
190
Table 63. SURVEY II RESULTS - INFANTRY VERSION (TOTAL)
z
Case H'UMAN FACTOR
Cohesion 0 1 3 30 8
Discipline 0 0 3 21 18
Initiar ;-e 0 1 4 18 9
Leadership 0 0 1 5 36
Morale 0 0 8 30 4
Training/Experience 0 0 3 18 21
__ Iill[3lotivarion 0 0 7 16 19
Cohesion 2 1 8 22 9
Discipline 1 I 5 14 21
Initiative 0 1 7 16 18
2 Leadcrship 0 1 1 7 33
Morale 2 3 10 21 6
Training[Experience 0 1 1 14 26
11ill/Motivation 1 2 6 16 16
Cohesion 4 2 14 18 4
Discipline 2 0 1 9 30
Initiative 4 3 10 14 11
3 Leadership 1 0 3 12 26
Morale 2 3 I1 13 13
Training/Experience 1 0 1 8 32
1'ill/.1forivation 1 3 12 12 14
Cohesion 0 1 9 21 11
Discipline 0 0 5 14 23
Initiative 0 3 9 11 19
4 Leadership 0 0 2 3 37
Mforale 0 1 5 19 17
Training/Experience 0 1 3 14 24
F1ill/,Motivarion 0 2 7 17 16
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Table 64. SURVEY II RESULTS - INFANTRY VERSION (INFANTRY)
2. z
Case HUMAN FACTOR
Cohesion 0 0 0 12 3
Discipline 0 0 1 7 7
Initiative 0 0 2 4 9
_Leadership 0 0 0 3 12
Morale 0 0 2 12 1
Training/Experience 0 0 1 5 9
i'll1h.1fotivation 0 0 3 5 7
Cohesion 0 1 5 7 2
Discipline 0 1 2 9 3
Initiative 0 1 2 5 7
2 Leadership 0 1 0 3 11
Mlorale 0 2 3 9 1
Training/Experience 0 1 0 3 11
!Ih/11/1orivation 0 2 3 7 3
Cohesion 2 0 4 8 1
Discipline 1 0 0 3 II
Initiative 1 1 6 4 3
3 Leadership 1 0 1 3 10
Morale 1 1 2 4 7
Training/Experience 1 0 0 5 9
ll11'.loti'ation 1 0 4 2 8
Cohesion 0 0 4 7 4
Discipline 0 0 1 6 8
Initiative 0 l 2 5 7
4 Leadership 0 0 1 1 13
Morale 0 0 2 7 6
Training/Experience 0 0 1 7 7
Wif/fMorivation 0 ! 4 6 4
192
Table 65. SURVEY II RESULTS - INFANTRY VERSION (NON-INFANTRY)
z
Case HUMAN FACTOR 2
Cohesion 0 1 3 18 5
Discipline 0 0 2 14 11
Initiatie 0 1 2 14 10
Leadership 0 0 1 2 24
Morale 0 0 6 18 3
Training/Experience 0 0 2 13 12
fl'ill/.lotivation 0 0 4 II 12
Cohesion 2 0 3 15 7
Discipline 1 0 3 5 18
Initiative 0 0 5 I1 11
2 Leadership 0 0 1 4 22
Morale 2 1 7 12 5
Training[Experience 0 0 1 if 15
JTi/Motivation 1 1 3 9 13
Cohesion 2 2 10 10 3
Discipline 1 0 1 6 19
Initiative 3 2 4 10 8
3 Leadership 0 0 2 9 16
Morale 1 2 9 9 6
Trainin"JExperience 0 0 1 3 23
JJ'il/Motivation 0 3 8 10 6
Cohesion 0 1 5 14 7
Discipline 0 0 4 8 15
Initiative 0 2 7 6 12
4 Leadership 0 0 1 2 24
Morale 0 1 3 12 II
Training/Experience 0 1 2 7 17
Wi/Ahlotivation 0 1 3 11 12
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Table 66. SCALED VALUES CASE I - INFANTRY
HUMAN FACTOR Total Infantry Non-Infantry
Cohesion 70.28 30.43 66.50
Discipline 92.43 97.79 89.74
Initiative 91.56 133.71 84.50
Leadership 181.19 170.07 259.00
Morale 58.38 43.93 54.68
Training/Expetrcnce 100.00 124.14 93.74
Wd'ill/Motiration 92.38 93.93 91.32
Table 67. RANKING CASE 1 - INFANTRY
HUMAN FACTOR Total Infantry Non-Infantry
Cohcion 6 7 6
Discipline 3 4 4
Initiative 5 2 5
Leadership I I I
Morale 7 6 7
Training/Experience 2 3 2
Wil[.l/otiration 4 $ 3
194
Table 68. SCALED VALUES CASE 2 - INFANTRY _ _ _ _ _
*HUMAN FACTOR Total Infantry Non-Infantry
Cohesion 69.21 53.00 74.16
Discipline 97.21 66.06 125.89
Initiatire 88.95 93.89 87.95
Leadership 155.95 168.94 158.52
M-Iorale 59.75 44.89 60.42
Training/Expericncc 116.55 168.94 104.90
Ill/M.otivation 84.00 5.296.16
Table 69. RANKING CASE 2 - INFANTRY_ _ _ _ _
H U MAN FACTOR Total Infantry Non-Infantry
Cohesion 6 6 6
Discipline 3 4 2
Initiative 4 3 5
Leadership 1 1.5 1
M~orale 7 7 7
Training/Experience 2 1.5 3
Will/Mo1tivation 5 5 4
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Table 70. SCALED VALUES CASE 3 - INFANTRY
HUMAN FACTOR Total Infantry Non-Infantry
Cohesion 50.89 46.38 52.14
Discipline 153.58 170.19 143.14
Initiative 64.58 55.19 69.67
Leadership 118.37 139.75 109.40
Morale 71.16 89.88 63.86
Training/Experience 157.58 124.13 168.75
1f4 ll/Motivation 73.32 92.00 66.78
Table 71. RANKING CASE 3 - INFANTRY
HUMAN FACTOR Total Infantry Non-Infantry
Cohesion 7 7 7
Discipline 2 1 2
Initiative 6 6 4
Leade rship 3 2 3
Morale 5 5 6
Training/Experience 1 3 1
il'Ul[. Motivation 4 4 5
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Table 72. SCALED VALUES CASE 4 - INFANTRY _ _ _ _ _
*HUMAN FACTOR Total Infantry Non-Infantry
Cohesion 76.20 72.95 73.32
Discipline 106.29 103.41 108.69
Initiative 90.40 93.89 83.26
Leadership 233.57 255.41 222.08
M,%orale 92.25 90.14 89.53
Training! Excrience 114.35 97.36 122.79
Will/Mo1tivation 86.65 67.79 93.37
Table 73. RANKING CASE 4 - INFANTRY_ _ _ _ _
HUMAN FACTOR Total Infantry Non-Infantry
Cohesion 7 6 7
Discipline 3 2 3
Initiative 5 4 6
Leadershipn I I I
Mlorale 4 5 5
Training/Experience 2 3 2
il/M1otivation 6 7 4
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2. Artillery Version Results
On the following pages are the raw and refined results for the Artillery
Version of Survey 11. Raw frequency results for Total, Artillery, and Non-
Artillery respondents are shown in Tables 74, 75, and 76, respectively. This is
followed by tables depicting the scaled values and rank orders on a case-by-case
basis.
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Table 74. SURVEY II RESULTS - ARTILLERY VERSION (TOTAL)
Case HUMAN FACTOR
Cohesion 0 0 4 14 16
Discipline 0 0 1 18 15
Initiative 0 0 4 14 16
Leadership 0 0 2 6 26
Morale 0 0 8 19 7
Training/Experience 0 0 1 13 20
Will/M lotivation 0 0 3 21 10
Cohesion 0 2 5 16 I!
Discipline 0 1 2 4 27
Initiative 0 1 5 15 13
2 Leadership 0 1 1 5 27
M1orale 0 1 4 20 7
Training/Experience 0 1 1 12 20
1i7"il]3otivation 0 1 3 11 19
Cohesion 0 3 12 16 3
Discipline 0 1 1 8 24
Initiative 1 3 12 11 7
3 Leadcrship 0 1 5 14 14
.Mforale 0 3 4 13 14
Training/Experience 0 1 1 7 25
H1 "ill/Motivation 0 1 6 17 10
Cohesion 0 2 7 9 16
Discipline 0 0 3 7 24
Initiative 0 1 9 15 9
4 Leadership 0 0 3 6 25
Morale 0 0 7 18 9
Training/Experience 0 1 4 13 16
H lill/ lorivation 0 2 3 16 13
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Cohesion 0 0 1 6 3
Discipline 0 0 1 4 5
Initiative 0 0 2 3 5
Leadership 0 0 1 1 8
Morale 0 0 2 7 1
lraining/Expcrience 0 0 1 4 5
ITill/.]lotivation 0 0 2 7 1
Cohesion 0 0 1 5 4
Discipline 0 0 1 1 8
Initiative 0 0 2 6 2
2 Leadership 0 0 1 1 8
Morale 0 0 1 7 2
Training/Experience 0 0 1 2 7
W1i!!/M1o tivation 0 0 1 3 6
Cohesion 0 0 4 4 2
Discipline 0 0 1 2 7
Initiative 0 0 5 4 1
3 Leadership 0 0 3 2 5
Morale 0 0 1 4 5
Training/Experience 0 0 I 1 8
I! 'il/[Morivation 0 0 2 5 3
Cohesion 0 l 3 2 4
Discipline 0 0 2 1 7
Initiative 0 0 3 4 3
4 Leadership 0 0 1 1 8
Morale 0 0 2 3 5
Training/Experience 0 0 2 4 4
Will/Motivation 0 0 1 4 5
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Table 76. SURVEY II RESULTS - ARTILLERY VERSION (NON-ARTILLERY)
Case HUMAN FACTOR " 2
Cohesion 0 0 3 8 13
Discipline 0 0 0 14 10
Initiative 0 0 2 11 if
Leadership 0 0 1 5 18
Morale 0 0 6 12 6
Training/Experience 0 0 0 9 15
tH'ill/.1orivation 0 0 1 14 9
Cohcsion 0 2 4 iI 7
Discipline 0 1 1 3 19
Initiarive 0 1 3 9 I1
2 Leadership 0 1 0 4 19
Morale 1 1 4 13 5
Training/qExperience 0 1 0 10 13
H ill/.Iothation 0 1 2 8 13
Cohesion 0 3 8 12 1
Discipline 0 1 0 6 17
Initiative 1 3 7 7 6
3 Leadership 0 1 2 12 9
Morale 0 3 3 9 9
Training/Experience 0 1 0 6 17
1711/otivation 0 1 4 12 7
Cohesion 0 1 4 7 12
Discipline 0 0 1 6 17
Initiative 0 1 6 !! 6
4 Leadership 0 0 2 5 17
Morale 0 0 5 15 4
Training/Experience 0 1 2 9 12
Will/Motivation 0 2 2 12 8
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Table 77. SCALED VALUES CASE I - ARTILLERY
HUMAN FACTOR Total Artillery Non-Artillery
Cohesion 94.13 71.71 109.50
Discipline 92.73 100.99 84.75
Initiati e 94.13 100.98 92.57
Leadership 185.47 294.00 163.21
Morale 46.73 40.00 49.64
Training/ Expcriencc 113.33 100.99 125.90
If ilI/Motivation 71.40 40.00 84.07
Table 78. RANKING CASE I - ARTILLERY
HUMAN FACTOR Total Artillery Non-Artillery
Cohs ion 3.5 5 3
Discipline 5 2.5 5
Initiative 3.5 4 4
Leadcrship 1 1 I
Morale 7 6.5 7
Training,'Expeirence 2 2.5 2
I1 ill.l orivarion 6 6.5 6
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Table 79. SCALED VALUES CASE 2 - ARTILLERY
HUMAN FACTOR Total Artillery Non-Artillery
Cohesion 78.72 86.91 73.88
Discipline 166.33 302.82 177.41
Initiative 85.06 52.00 92.88
Leadership 169.39 302.82 171.35
Morale 69.48 62.82 69.28
7raining/Expcricnce 113.61 175.91 107.65
11 ill/Motivation 106.22 129.55 105.00
Table 80. RANKING CASE 2 - ARTILLERY
iM MAN FACTOR Total Artillery Non-Artillery
Cohesion 6 5 6
Discipline 2 1.5 1
Initiatit e 5 7 5
Leadership 1 1.5 2
Morale 7 6 7
Trainin., i Expcrience 3 3 3
1 "illi, 1oti'aion 4 4 4
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Table 81. SCALED VALUES CASE 3- ARTILLERY
HUMAN FACTOR Total Artillery Non-Artillery
Cohesion 61.16 24.78 56.93
Discipline 138.36 181.11 129.74
Initiative 69.96 0 72.17
Leadership 90.72 107.12 89.26
Morale 90.48 107.13 84.37
Trainingl/Experience 147.00 311.78 129.74
1I dl1 1loti'ation 82.24 66.00 81.22
Table 82. RANKING CASE 3 - ARTILLERY
i HUMAN FACTOR Total Artillery Non-Artillery
Cohesion 7 6 7
Discipline 2 2 1.5
Initiative 6 7 6
Leadership 3 4 3
Aforale 4 3 4
Training! Experience I 1 1.5
iW ill/Motivation 5 5 5
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Table 83. SCALED VALUES CASE 4 - ARTILLERY _____
HUMAN FACTOR Total Artillery Non-Artillery
Cohesion 91.35 85.47 97.05
Discipline 138.28 143.93 127.90
Initiative 72.25 77.22 69.95
Leadership 149.44 152.00 139.57
Morale 77.44 92.73 67.38
Training/Experience 96.85 85.59 102.74
If iWl/.1lotivation 88.50 92.74 81.58
Table 84. RANKING CASE 4 - ARTILLERY _____
HUMXAN FACTOR Total Artillery Non-Artillery
Cohesion 4 6 4
*Discipline 2 2 2
Irnitative 7 7 6
Leadership I I I
M1orale 6 4 7
Training/Experience 3 5 3
WillMotivation 5 3 5
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3. Respondent Comments
At the end of Survey II, all respondents were asked to comment on:
* Whether the survey was understandable;
9 Whether the survey was realistic;
0 Assumptions required to complete the survey;
Of the 130 total respondents (Infantry and Artillery combined), 128 regarded the
survey as both understandable and realistic. Assumptions made by individual
respondents are listed on the following page.
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Survey H Respondent Assumptions
• Threat actions would proceed in accordance with established threat
doctrine, especially the Spetznatz-type rear area actions. Each scenario
required individual ranking of factors, based on the type of decision
made. For example, selection of the ASP platoon depended most on
leadership, initiative of the platoon leader selected, since the XO was
gone, while the MOPP decision depended on the troops' level of training
and discipline under NBC conditions. The company commander was
competent and fully understood the strengths/weaknesses of his unit.
* I assumed the soldiers I would order on a mission were similar to those
I worked and trained with when I was stationed in Germany and at Fort
Campbell, KY.
• I feel that no matter what mission you perform the human factors you
listed are all very important. I have real trouble saying that any one of
them is less than "very important".
e The platoons within the company were all in the same basic state for the
given human factors.
* That the company was properly trained to do each required mission.
The commander had complete control over each situation.
* The majority of the unit had been together at least 9 months; the unit
had performed at least company ARTEP evaluations within 60 days;
platoon leaders: 3 out of the 4 were 1st lieutenants, commander had at
least 2 months command with the battalion; and that the commander
will use the external fire support.
* Thorough knowledge of junior leader capabilities under stressful condi-
tions. General high level of competence/training in the NCO chain of
command in each platoon.
* Mainly to assume away those external factors that would primarily drive
many of these decisions. Morale and cohesion are things to build in
peacetime, and it's always better to have them than not, but I think that
rarely will they be significant factors in making these decisions. I had
difficulty making the distinctions between neutral, unimportant, and
very unimportant. If it's not important in a decision, how much "not
important" is hard to say.
* Soldiers perform the same during combat situations as in peacetime
situations/exercises. That these human factors would have any bearing
on the outcome of each action(this is coupled to the above statement).
207
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Dunnigan, James F., "How To Make War - A Comprehensive Guide to
Modern Warfare", William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1988.
2. Dupuy, Trevor N., and Martell, Paul, "Flawed Victory: The Arab-Israeli
Cotflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon", HERO Books, 1986.
3. Hill, Martin, "The Vincennes: Seven Minutes in July", San Diego Magazine,
February, 1989.
4. Interview between Guy T. Shields, CPT (P), Battalion Operations Officer
(S-3), 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (Light),
Fort Ord, CA., and Randal A. Dragon, 4 February 1990.
5. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Force Development: Operational
Test and Evaluation Methodology and Procedures Guide, DA Pam 71-3
(Draft), December 1988.
6. Sanders, Mark S., and McCormick, Ernest J., Human Factors in Engineering
and Design, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987.
7. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and As-
sociated Terms, JCS Publication Number 1, 1 June 1979.
8. Orr, George E., Combat Operations C31: Fundamentals and Interactions, Re-
search Report Number AU-ARI-82-5, Air University Press, July 1983.
9. Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Harvard University Press, 1985.
209
10. Champanis, Alphonse, "Some Reflections on Progress", Proceedings of the
Human Factors Society 29th Annual Meeting, Santa Monica, CA.: Human
Factors Society, 1985.
11. Staff Writers, "Too Much, Too Soon: Information Overload", IEEE Spec-
trum, June 1987.
12. Bailey, R., Human Performance Engineering - A Guide for Systems
Designers, Prentice-Hall, 1982.
13. Grin, John, "Command and Control: Force Multiplier or Achilles' Heel?",
Unit for the Social Aspects of Science, Department of Physics, Free Uni-
versity, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Date Unknown.
14. Hughes, Wayne P., and others, Militaiy Modeling, Military Operations Re-
search Society, Inc., 1984
15. Schroth, Timothy F., An Introduction to Human Factors and Combat
Models, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., March
1989.
16. Booher, Harold R., MANPRINT: An Approach to Systems Integration, Van
Nostrand Reinhold, 1990.
17. Department of the Army, Light Infantry Squad and Platoon Operations and
ARTEP Mission Training Plan (AMTP), FC 7-15, December 1984.
18. Marashian, Charles D., A Study of Human Factors that Affect Combat Ef-
fectiveness, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.,
June 1982.
210
19. Hughes, Wayne P., "Combat Science: An Organizing Study", Naval Post-
graduate School,Monterey, CA., 1990.
J
20. Watson, Peter, War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychol-
ogy, Basic Books, Inc., 1978.
21. United States Government Accounting Office, Report to the Secretary of the
Army, Report Number GAO/NSIAD-86-130, Army Training: National
Training Center's Potential Has Not Been Realized, July 1986.
22. Lawson Sr., Joel S., 'The State Variables of a Command and Control Sys-
tem", Proceedings for Quantitative Assessment of the Utility of Command and
Control Systems, National Defense University, January 1980.
23. Miller, George A., "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some
Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information", The Psychological Re-
view, Volume 63, Number 2, March 1956.
24. Funk and Wagnalls, "New Standard Dictionary of the English Language",
Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1933.
25. Vandivier, Phillip L., "Soldier Dimensions In Combat Models", Draft Copy,
TRADOC Analyis Command (TRAC-FBHN), October 1989.
26. Hughes, Wayne P., "Command and Control Within the Framework of a
Theory of Combat", Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., 1989.
27. Dupuy, Trevor N., "The Fundamental Information Base for Modeling Be-
havior in Combat", Date Unknown.
211
28. Marshall, Catherine and Rossman Gretchen B., "Designing Qualitative Re-
search", Sage Publications, 1989.
29. Torgerson, W.S., "Theory and Methods of Scaling", John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1958.
30. Lindsay, Glenn F., "Using Data Resulting From Categorical Judgments",
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., September 1981.
31. Dyer, R.F., and others, "Questionaire Construction Manual", Ft. Hood Field
Unit, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,
September 1976.
32. Keegan, J., and Holmes, R., with John Gau, "Soldiers: A History of Men in
Battle", Elizabeth Sifton Viking Books, 1985.
212
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Benderly, Beryl, L., "Everyday Intuition", Psychology Today, September,
1989.
Crawford, Paul M., Dynamic Study of Factors Impacting on Combat Power,
Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., March 1988.
Van Nostrand, Sally J., Fire Fighting Task Force (Fire) Study, Study Report
CAA-SR-89-10, U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, April 1989.
Henderson William, D., Cohesion: The Human Element In Combat, Na-
tional Defense University Press, 1985.
Jablin, Fredric M., and others, Handbook of Organizational
Communication, Sage Publications, Date Unknown.
Miller, Richard S., "A Framework For Establishing The Need For and
Value of C2 ", Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., June 1980.
MIT Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Modeling and
Measuring Effectiveness of C2 Systems, by Levis, Alexander, H., September
1986.
Van Nostrand, Sally J., Model Effectiveness as a Function of Personnel,
Study Report CAA-SR-86-34, U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Sep-
tember 1986.
213




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. Director for Command, Control and 1
Communications Systems, Joint Staff
Washington, DC 20318-6000
4. C3 Academic Group, Code CC I
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
5. Dr. Samuel H. Parry, Code OR/PY 2




Attn: Mr. E.B. Vandiver III
U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency
Bethesda, MD 20814
7. CPT James S. Couey 2
1615 Knox Street
Dublin, GA 31021




U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
ATTN: ATCD
Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000
215
10. Headquarters, Department of the Army
DUSA-OR
ATTN: Mr. Walter W. Hollis
Room 2E660, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-0102
11. Commander
U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command
ATTN: ATRC
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-5200
12. Director
U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command - Ft. Leavenworth
ATTN: ATRC-F
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-5200
13. Director
U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command - Ft. Leavenworth
ATTN: ATRC-FOQ (Technical Information Center)
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-5200
14. Director
U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command - WSMR
ATTN: ATRC-W
White Sands Missile Range, NM 88002-5502
15. Director
U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command - WSMR
ATTN: ATRC-WSL (Technical Library)
White Sands Missile Range, NM 88002-5502
16. Director
U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command - Research Directorate
ATTN: ATRC-RD
White Sands Missile Range, NM 88002-5502
17. Director





U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Command - Ft. Benjamin Harrison
ATTN: ATRC-FB
Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 46216-5000
216
19. Director I
U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Activity
8120 Woodmont Ave.
Bethesda, MD 20814-2797
20. U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Library (CARL)
ATTN: ATZL-SWS-L
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027
21. Headquarters, Department of the Army 2
Directorate for MANPRINT Research and Studies
DAPE-MR
Washington, DC 20310-0300
217
